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
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
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
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THE CHAPLAIN AS PERSONAL/SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER

BY

CHAPLAIN (COLONEL) HENRY F. ACKERMANN
CHAPLAIN (COLONEL) DONALD W. SHEA

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

THE CHAPLAIN AS PERSONAL/SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER

GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

Chaplain (Colonel) Henry F. Ackermann
Chaplain (Colonel) Donald W. Shea

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
13 April 1984

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ABSTRACT

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PREFACE

This Group Study Project was produced under the guidance of Colonel Dwane C. Watson, DCLM, US Army War College.

The topic was suggested by the Chief of Chaplains as a current as well as continuing issue in the Chaplaincy. The study is an attempt to draw together all the evidence available around the issue of the Chaplain's staff relationship to the Commander.

We also take this opportunity to thank those many people at the US Army War College who contributed to this study. They all helped in some special way which enabled us to put together the study.

Many thanks to Chaplain (LTC) Wayne E. Kuehne, action officer at the Office, Chief of Chaplains, who willingly shared his extensive knowledge with us, was always ready to help us locate what we needed. He is the "subject matter" expert.

And finally, a special word of gratitude to Colonel "Duke" Watson who did more than he needed to as our advisor. He was always ready to help when called on, encouraged us, and "kept our feet to the fire."

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The chaplain historically has been a member of the commander's staff at whatever level he serves. Chaplains serve as either members of the personal or special staff of the commander. Personal staff designation for the chaplain is at the discretion of the commander but the relationship established at Department of Army Staff level has served as the model.

At Department of Army Staff level the Chief of Chaplains is designated a Personal Staff member while the Office Chief of Chaplains (OCCH) carries special staff status. The Personal Staff assists the Chief of Staff in specifically designated areas. The Special Staff assists the Secretary of the Army in professional, technical and other specialized functional areas.

In December 1982 the Department of Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DA-DCSPER) initiated an effort to standardize Installation Personnel Management. In June 1983 a paper was staffed which, among other considerations proposed a strawman concept that had the Chaplain, Provost Marshal, Surgeon, and Equal Employment Opportunity Officer subordinate to the G-1 under DA-DCSPER. This proposal and subsequent actions and reactions is discussed in Section IIB of this study and is excerpted in Annex III.

This latest initiative by the Department of Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel prompted this study.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This study will analyze the uniqueness of the chaplain's role in the Army; examine the past fifteen years of proactive chaplain ministry; and state past, current and proposed staff relationships with commanders in order to determine the optimum staff position for chaplain and commander/system effectiveness.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology used was:

1. Determine the need for the study of the chaplain on the commander's staff. This was accomplished through a series of interviews and discussions with the Chief of Chaplains, US Army and action officers in his office.
2. Review current status of chaplain/commander staff relationship.
3. Review current DA-DCSPER proposal to modify chaplain/commander staff relationship.
4. Research regulations, publications, files (DACH, TRADOC), and other pertinent data.
5. Determine key individuals to be interviewed for the study (former Chiefs of Chaplains, Commandant of the Chaplain School, and other past and present key persons in the US Army Chaplaincy).
6. Prepare questions to be asked in interviews based on current DA-DCSPER proposal and historical review of staff relationships.
7. Prepare and dispatch letters containing questions and

explaining the proposed study to previously selected key persons.

8. Arrange for and conduct interviews.
9. Transcribe interviews into written summaries.
10. Research historical status of chaplain as staff officer.
11. Conduct a sociological analysis of chaplains' ministry.
12. Present a historical analysis of chaplain initiatives in the past fifteen years (interviews and historical research).
13. Determine appropriate material to be used in the study from all compiled research data.
14. Determine final form of study.
15. Prepare draft of study.
16. Edit study. Revise.
17. Prepare study in final form.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

1. Introduction
 - a. Statement of the Problem.
 - b. Methodology used.
2. Presentation of Research
 - a. Present status of the chaplain on personal or special staff of the commander.
 - b. Attempts to place the chaplain under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.
 - c. Analysis of chaplain ministry as personal or special staff officer.
 - d. Analysis of significant chaplain activities during the past fifteen years.

3. Research findings
 - a. Summary
 - b. Conclusions
 - c. Recommendations
4. Supporting Material

CHAPTER II

PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH

PRESENT STATUS OF THE CHAPLAIN ON PERSONAL OR SPECIAL STAFFS

To analyze the effectiveness of the chaplain as special or personal staff officer, a review of current doctrine is necessary.

In August 1973, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) approved the designation of the Chief of Chaplains (CCH) as a Personal Staff officer. The offices of the Chief of Chaplains, Chief of Information and the Judge Advocate General are properly designated as Special Staff elements because they clearly represent particular professional or technical interests. However, in accordance with accepted Army practice, the CSA designated the heads of these agencies as Personal Staff reporting to him directly on matters he does not desire to be handled through normal staff channels. The designation of Chief of Chaplains, Chief of Information and the Judge Advocate General as Personal Staff officers appropriately is carried as a footnote on the organization chart of the staff element concerned. In January 1974 AR 10-5 incorporated these changes in staff relationships. Subsequent revision of AR 10-5 in 1980 confirmed the designation of the Chief of Chaplains as a Personal Staff officer to the CSA.¹

OPERATION-STEADFAST (1972-1973) which reorganized the US Continental Army Command (CONARC) into US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), designated present chaplain staff positions as personal or special non-directorate staff positions.

The relevant organization charts from the STEADFAST document are at Annex I. The Army Mobilization Plan shows the Office of the Chief of Chaplains (OCCH) as a Special Staff Section,² and AR 5-3 lists the chaplain among personal staff officers.³

ATTEMPTS TO PLACE THE CHAPLAIN UNDER THE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL (DCSPER)

The DA-DCSPER has, at various times, recommended that the chaplain as well as other special staff sections be placed under the DCSPER. These initiatives, reasons for the proposals, and their results comprise this section of the study.

In his March 1966 review of the US Army Combat Developments Command Study, "The Administrative Support Theater Army 1965-70 (TASTA-70)," the Chief of Chaplains, Ch (MG) Charles E. Brown, Jr., refused to concur in a proposal of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development to eliminate the chaplain, medical, and military police special staff sections in support headquarters and to integrate them into the section of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1. In April 1966 it appeared that the Chief of Chaplains had won his point, but in May 1966 the CSA Summary Sheet on TASTA-70 came out reversing the April 1966 resolution of the problem.

In again withholding his concurrence, the Chief of Chaplains expressed his professional opinion that the proposal of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development "will materially diminish the enviable position the Army now holds in the eyes of civilian religious leaders in America who have been providing chaplains that have traditionally served on the special administrative staff of the commander." The Chief of Staff's decision was based on his determination that the

coordinating staff of each major support command headquarters would provide the essential chaplain, medical and military police staff capability. The senior chaplain, medical, and military police staff officers would be coordinated by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel but would be authorized direct access to the commander on matters of command interest.⁴

At other times the chaplain's staff status was singled out, as in August 1967.

The Staff Chaplain, 1st Field Forces, Vietnam informed this office (Office Chief of Army Chaplains) that his headquarters planned in the near future to reorganize under a new table of organization and equipment, MTOE 52-1T. In this table of organization, as modified, the chaplain section is eliminated as a staff section. It becomes an integral division of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1) and its personnel are listed in the paragraph describing the latter general staff section. At the same time the provost marshal, adjutant general, and the surgeon retain their special staff status. The staff chaplain saw this as depriving the chaplain of the commander-chaplain relationship described in AR 165-20; as resulting in delayed coordination with special staff sections with which the chaplain must frequently coordinate; and as conceivably having the consequence that chaplains and their enlisted assistant might be expected to share in G-1 section responsibilities and projects. Since at higher echelons the chaplains retain their special staff status, he requested this office's guidance in defining staff relationships within a Corps type headquarters. In its reply this office noted that the original Table of Organization and Equipment NO. 52-1T was published in June 1965 apparently without coordination with Department of Army Staff agencies. This office had been assured that when the new MTOE would come out it would be properly staffed and at that time this office would register its objections to the proposed change. In the meantime, this office called the staff chaplain's attention to a statement of policy by General William C. Westmoreland, USA, that the chaplain would not be moved from his present position on the special staff.⁵

In January 1969 a draft directive on CONUS Installation Management proposed "that the installation chaplain be placed under a 'director of personnel and community services' or under a 'modified director of personnel and community activities' or under a 'director of welfare and recreation.'⁶ The proposal was studied and the response from the Office Chief of Chaplains recommended:

1. The proposal be modified to preserve the traditional and accepted role of the chaplain as staff advisor to the commander on religion and morals and as pastor-confessor to every member of the command as well as operator of the religious program;
2. The office of the chaplain be retained as a separate entity under the staff supervision of the director of personnel and community affairs, but in the direct chain of command from the commander through the chief of staff and/or deputy commander.⁷

The CONUS, CONARC Installation Management Study (CIMS) called for revision of AR 10-10, implementing among other changes the placing of the chaplain in the G-1 organization. Arguments were stated on both sides. The Office, Chief of Chaplains once again proposed separate special staff positions for the chaplain.

It repeated its previous expositions of the rationale for this recommendation and appealed to the experience of the headquarters of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, of the United States Army, Pacific, and of the United States Army, Ryukyu Islands. In each case the staff chaplains' office had been merged with the G-1 organization and in each case it was reestablished as a separate staff activity. It had been found that putting the chaplain in the G-1 organization jeopardized the chaplain's traditional roles as staff advisor to the commander on religion and morals, operator of the religious program and spiritual leader of the Army community, and pastor/ confessor to every member of that command. The memorandum argued that a nonprofessional person is not competent by education or experience to control the chaplain section and that it is unfair both to such a person and to the religious program to expect him to function in this capacity. It saw staff supervision of the professional branches (chaplain, surgeon, lawyer) as quite

different from the direct responsibility that integration into a section would involve. It warned that adoption of the proposal would certainly have negative impact on civilian denominational endorsing agencies and on the recruitment of quality seminarians and clergymen for the chaplaincy.⁸

The recommendation of the Office Chief of Chaplains was not incorporated in the published version of AR 10-10.⁹

The issue was contested into 1973. (The portion of the CIMS Evaluation pertaining to the chaplain issue and the Chief of Chaplains nonconcurrence is Annex II.)

Finally, in August 1973, the Secretary of the General Staff signed a memorandum changing the organizational relationships of the Chief of Chaplains and the Surgeon General. The Chief of Chaplains was designated a member of the personal staff of the Chief of Staff of the Army.¹⁰ This was followed by a revision of AR 10-10 reflecting the CSA's decision to place the Chief of Chaplains on his personal staff and recommending the placement of command chaplains on the personal staff of the Commander.¹¹

Thus, in 1975 the Chief of Chaplains Annual Report of Major Activities--Historical Review noted:

The effort of the Office Chief of Chaplains since the review of the CONUS Installation Management Study in May 1972 to move the installation staff chaplain from under the Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA) and placed on the personal staff of the installation commander began to bear fruit in FY 1975. The draft revision of AR 10-10, which was not published by the end of the Fiscal Year, did contain the change in 'location' of the installation staff chaplain sought by this office.¹²

Ten years later, however, the issue was again joined. This time the installation support structure was examined with the idea of improving personnel and community activities support to soldiers and

their families. Among other suggestions it was recommended the chaplain be placed under the DCSPER/G-1 at installation level. Excerpts of documents from and to DA-DCSPER, Major Army Commands (MACOMS), OCCH and other interested staff sections are included at Annex III. Responses from the MACOMS unanimously nonconcurred with the DCSPER recommendations taking away personal and special staff status from the chaplain.

"Standardization" was the reason given by DA-DCSPER for the consolidation of various staff sections. As noted by the Comptroller of the Army, however, the placing of the chaplain and the surgeon/dental surgeon would be nonstandard since at Department of Army (DA) level the Chief of Chaplains and The Surgeon General are Special Staff members.¹³ Of special note is the Comptroller of the Army's analysis of the role of the chaplain in a 15 June 1983 Memorandum for LTG M. Thurman (DA-DCSPER):

The Chaplain, although a 'Special Staff' officer, traditionally also serves the commander in a 'Personal Staff' role. Chaplains have a unique and often confidential role to play as the reliable conduit between members of the command and the commander. Additionally, the Chaplain is uniquely qualified to be the commander's 'sounding board' for matters involving ethics and morality and he/she is also uniquely qualified to provide personal counsel to the commander concerning what is 'right' or 'wrong' about a wide variety of subjects. I am strongly opposed to inserting anyone, let alone two organizational layers, between the Command Group and the Chaplain; to do so, in my opinion, is a disservice to both the commander and the command.¹⁴

ANALYSIS OF CHAPLAIN MINISTRY AS PERSONAL OR SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER

The rationale for the chaplain as personal or special staff officer can best be understood through an analysis of the uniqueness of chaplains and their ministry.

The US Army chaplaincy is as old as the nation. When the American Armed Forces were formed, the military chaplaincy was born. The first chaplains were local ministers who, as a matter of course, accompanied militiamen into battle. In July, 1775, the Continental Congress put the Chaplaincy on a legal federal basis by providing their pay be twenty dollars a month. Within a year, after the official authorization, George Washington issued the following order:

The honorable Continental Congress having been pleased to allow a Chaplain to each Regiment, the Colonels or Commanding Officers of each Regiment are directed to procure Chaplains accordingly; persons of good character and exemplary lives--to see that all inferior officers pay them a suitable respect and attend carefully upon religious exercises.¹⁵

Since then military chaplains have been in the vanguard of their denominations fostering spiritual growth and encouraging men and women to express their faith actively. At the same time chaplains have been called to a ministry that transcends denominational boundaries as well as chapel walls. It is a challenge well met by a unique type of Army Officer--for the chaplain is the only officer who is a member of a total nonmilitary institution--the church/synagogue, serving in a total military institution--the Army.

This institutional duality is an important but often overlooked factor in assigning special staff status to chaplains. It is the first consideration in understanding the uniqueness of the chaplains and their ministry.

Chaplains are fully members of both church/synagogue and military. Though they leave the customary environment of the church/synagogue, they retain their full clerical status. They are still subject to its authority. They are not only expected but probably required to attend

periodical meetings of the denomination to which they belong or retreats provided by their denomination. Their function in the armed forces is that of a clergyperson, and in reality they cannot continue to function without the ordination and endorsement of their denomination. But at the same time they are commissioned officers and fully a part of their military organization. They wear the same uniform, obey the same regulations, are paid the same salary, and are assigned to duty by the same kind of orders as any other officer. The chaplain participates fully in both institutions.

All other staff professionals in the Army bring with them professional specialties, standards, and ethical codes. Physicians, dentists, and lawyers, as well as chaplains, provide specialized services available only from their respective professions. Only chaplains work for goals established by an institution outside the Armed Forces and are subject to the authority of that outside institution. Again, acceptability as a chaplain is contingent upon continuance in good standing within a specific denomination and the withdrawal of its ecclesiastical endorsement brings immediate separation from duty.

Few military commanders are consciously aware of this difference between chaplains and other staff professionals. If they think about it at all, they probably regard it as unimportant. This is not to imply that they perceive any conflict between the institutional goals of churches/synagogues and their own best interest. They have long regarded provision for religious worship and expression as necessary for the human welfare of those who make up the Army. But they have often continued to think of chaplains as their own professionals in the field of religion. The institutional duality of the chaplaincy has not been

an important issue for them. However, when this duality is fully recognized by the church/ synagogue and the military, the chaplaincy will be most effective. The chaplain is fully a member of both institutions--a unique kind of officer and a unique kind of clergyperson--with clear responsibilities in both directions.

The second step in understanding the chaplains' role is to examine their ministry. In a short concise history of the chaplaincy of the US Armed Forces, Professor George H. Williams of Harvard University accurately stated that ministry consists of "a whole range of shifting models: the soothsayer, the officer's chaplain, the enlisted man's padre, the fighting parson, the specialized counselor, the cheerleader, the charismatic mascot or talisman for sacred unbelievers, the morale officer, and now perhaps even the prophet."¹⁶

There is no single definition of ministry. This is especially true in the United States of America, a religiously pluralistic society. All definitions identify ministry as "religious," and regard it as "people-oriented." However, the meaning of the term "religious," the relationship between "religious" and "people-oriented" activities, and the extent to which any people-oriented activities are regarded as "religious" are all subject to differing interpretations. Ministry takes different functional forms in response to different human needs. In the institutional church, ministry varies widely in rural settings, inner city parishes, hospital chaplaincies, or foreign missions. Likewise, the form ministry takes in the Army is determined by the military environment and needs of the people served. Chaplain ministry is seen in the traditional pastoral roles of counselor, preacher, liturgist, priest, rabbi and religious educator but it is seen as well in a concern

for the welfare of all soldiers and their families, humanitarian outreach and other "non-traditional," creative forms of ministry. An additional aspect of ministry in the military chaplaincy has been labeled "shared insider" ministry. What this suggests is that chaplains as members of the total military institution have opportunities to minister unavailable to their civilian counterparts.

Shared insider status in a total institution affects ministry in four significant ways: (1) It removes the element of artificiality which sometimes intervenes between the pastor and the parishioner who wants to show only his Sunday self; (2) It enables the chaplain to share fully the conditions under which his parishioners live, and thus prepares him for a more effective pastoral ministry to their needs; (3) It places him in natural and continuing contact with the unchurched as well as the church; (4) It also makes it possible for him to minister creatively to the institution itself, as well as to the persons who make up the institution.¹⁷

It should also be noted that the

military's responsibility in role definition has to do with establishing the 'conditions' of religious ministry and defining the human needs to which its chaplains, as religious professionals, are expected to respond. It is neither the responsibility nor the right of the military to define the basic role and mission of clergymen as anything other than the religious ministry for which their churches ordained them.¹⁸

In whatever form ministry takes the chaplain is pastor to all regardless of rank. Chaplains serve in units, not in chapels because units are where soldiers are and soldiers are to be served.

This brings us to the third step in understanding the special staff status of the chaplain--an examination of the relationship between commander and chaplain.

The military staff system brings together the principle of military command and the principle of bureaucratic organization. The military commander bears ultimate responsibility for everything that happens in

the command. In the Army, "commanders are responsible for the religious life, morals, and morale of their commands, and will give necessary support to ensure effective religious programs on post."¹⁹ This means that along with the principle of command responsibility goes a staff system in which the commander, who normally has no technical training whatever in the field of religion and is expected to have none, has been given a staff professional--the chaplain--to be his expert in the field.

An understanding of the staff system and acceptance of the staff relationship will clarify the place of the chaplain within the military organization. The chaplain's personal role as religious leader is at the same time more independently responsible, and less so, than is the equivalent role in the civilian church/synagogue. It is more responsible because the chaplain is a religious professional in a nonreligious organization, with fewer professional checks and balances than in a church/synagogue system. The chaplain is the "religious expert" and stands alone. But at the same time chaplains are less independently responsible because they are not the focal point of the organizational system, as is the pastor/rabbi of the local church/synagogue. In the Army, the commanding officer is the focal point of everything. The chaplain is a subfocal point, with all religious activities having their place in the larger picture of the command.

In order for the staff relationship to function as well as possible commanders should recognize that they have a special relationship with and responsibility to the chaplain. They should know their chaplain and solicit the chaplain's view on all decisions relating to religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion. They should also understand that their chaplain is a clergyperson who represents the churches and synagogues of America to the command.²⁰

Conversely, chaplains, in the best staff relationships ideally offer a flexible stability to their commander by conscientiously fulfilling the role of advisor and leader. Also, as a staff advisor, the chaplain should be prophetic, representing social justice and responsible order. And finally the chaplain has the responsibility to give accurate, honest and timely staff advice. The institutional duality of the chaplain, his broad ministry and the relationship between commander and chaplain needs to be fully understood if the chaplain is to be as effective as possible in ministry to the Army.

This was clearly and forcefully stated in a 1972 memorandum from Chaplain (MG) Gerhardt W. Hyatt, Chief of Chaplains, for MG Warren K. Bennett, Secretary of the General Staff:

The Son My Incident demonstrated the essential requirement for a free, honest and open relationship between the commander and his chaplain. All barriers must be removed. Experience in tactical and nontactical units confirms the inadvisability of placing a professional officer with the unique role of the chaplain in an organizational posture which restricts his total ministry. The traditional mission of the chaplain is to be a staff advisor to the commander on matters of religion, moral responsibility and human relations. An equally important mission is to be a pastor/confessor to every member of the command. When the chaplain is required to filter his reports, recommendations and ministry through intermediate staff levels, such as the DPCA of an installation or G-1 of a division, there is a built-in deterrent to effective and timely communication with the commander. This can result in the failure of the commander to be fully informed about all aspects of his command. No commander would be indifferent to the counsel of his chaplain in such a case. However, the commander must have direct access to such counsel.²¹

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES
DURING THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS

The chaplain's value to the Army as personal or special staff officer has been exemplified by the unique contributions of chaplains in the past fifteen years.

Organizations and institutions, such as the Army, often find themselves limited as to what they are capable of accomplishing in certain people related areas. The Army chaplaincy, maintaining its membership in a nonmilitary institution, has proven to be ideal in functioning as an intervention vehicle when the Army finds itself at such limits. In the case of the Army these "limits" center around ethical, social, religious and personal concerns. It was by design that the Founding Fathers placed chaplains in the Army to remedy, heal and propose suitable solutions for "human" concerns. When the challenge has been articulated, the solution arrived at and effectively functioning, the program becomes institutionalized within the Army. At that point the chaplaincy prepares to anticipate and/or meet the next human issue, social concern or ethical crisis. Ministry comes in many forms.

The fifteen year span covered in this analysis was an extremely critical period in the history of the United States Army. After Vietnam the Army was being examined carefully by the American people. They questioned the Army's mission and looked with disfavor at military personnel. Drug and alcohol problems were highly visible inside and outside the military community and the civilian society often used the military as a scapegoat. There was also a growing concern among the Army's leadership about what was happening to the soldier, and ways were

sought to solve or resolve the human and social problems within the Army. This was the period that saw the introduction of the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) and the challenge of understanding and motivating the young soldier.

The following examples of significant action programs show how the chaplain, as a member of the commander's personal or special staff, addressed the problems of the Army in a creative way while meeting the challenge of the commander and providing a proactive ministry.

Human Self Development Program

The nomination of Luther D. Miller as Chief of Army Chaplains was confirmed by the US Senate on 11 April 1945. As Chief of Army Chaplains, Chaplain Miller set a different focus for the post War Army Chaplaincy. He described the post war chaplains as influential military instructors in morality. In line with post war temper and mood, he believed "that moral training was a prerequisite for a continuing democracy and saw future chaplains as educators who would help build a stronger citizenry."²² In 1946 the War Department made plans for an experimental Universal Military Training Unit (UMT). When plans for this unit were sent to the Office, Chief of Army Chaplains for comment the suggestion was made that Army chaplains present prepared lectures on topics related to citizenship and morality. The suggestion was adopted.²³

Following World War II there was serious concern in the Army about the increase of venereal disease. On 24 January 1947, Secretary of War, Robert Patterson sent Ch (MG) Luther D. Miller, Chief of Army Chaplains, a five page restricted letter entitled, "Discipline and Venereal Disease." Secretary Patterson directed chaplains to play a major role in the battle against venereal disease by authorizing a new lecture program.

The Corps of Chaplains bears a special responsibility for the moral and spiritual welfare of troops. To aid the chaplain in meeting this responsibility, commanding officers will allocate appropriate periods in the regular training schedule for instruction in citizenship and morality which all personnel will attend. This instruction will be prepared in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.²⁴

Chaplain Miller's immediate response as Chief of Chaplains was clearly stated in the Army and Navy Journal:

The new weekly Army publication, known as The Chaplain's Hour made its debut on 12 September 1947 . . . the eight page first issue of the Chaplain's Hour contains material for a lecture on citizenship and morality. Such lectures are to be given throughout the Army by chaplains as a regular feature wherever troops are stationed.²⁵

From 1947 to 1972 the program had various titles. It was known successively as "The Chaplain's Hour," "Character Guidance Instruction," "Our Moral Heritage Series," and "Human Self Development." The Army, being a microcosm of the civilian sector, reflects the changes in national attitudes as well as sharing substantially in the social problems confronting society. These same attitudes and problems confront commanders as they exercise leadership over soldiers from that national and social milieu.

The initial program, "The Chaplain's Hour," exemplified the chaplain's role and creativity in meeting the needs of the commander. As this evolved into the "Character Guidance Program" the needs of the command and the changing national mood of the time were clearly addressed. The programs continued to "assist the commander in accomplishing his mission by optimal development of the Army's most important resource--people," (AR 600-30).²⁶ The Character Guidance Program, in response to

the needs of the commander, identified and taught those aspects of American values which are the moral foundation of citizenship and character development.

In the early 1970's the commander was challenged by problems of racism, rights of the individual, and continued drug and alcohol abuse. Chaplain (MG) Francis L. Sampson, the Chief of Chaplains, as a member of the personal and special staff of the Chief of Staff of the Army, was able to respond with a comprehensive and unified program to address these issues through the "Our Moral Heritage Series" which began in July 1970. This program stressed the heritage of the soldier as expressed in the areas of human relations, social ethics and the personal dignity of the individual. The purpose of the series was to enlighten as well as to provide a forum for discussing contemporary social issues. A later spin-off of this program would be seen in Human Relations Programs.

The capstone of this evolutionary series of programs was in FY 1973 with the implementation of the "Human Self Development Program" under Chaplain (MG) Gerhardt W. Hyatt, Chief of Chaplains. The Human Self Development Program was an Army-wide coordinated human relations program. It was designed to encourage high standards in personal and social conduct and produce a strategy for community action and value education. In human self development classes, leaders sought to assist soldiers to improve their self image.²⁷

At each stage of this command program, for which the chaplain had primary staff responsibility, the development of the value dimension of human problems and personal growth needs were addressed as positive alternatives to disease, crime, racism, alcohol and drug abuse, and dysfunctional behavior. By the chaplain being on the commander's personal and special staff these programs were able to meet immediately the

needs of the commander in an organized, unified and systemic manner throughout the Army. In summary, these programs served the commander in the following manner:

1. They related the immediate concern of the commander and the military for the welfare and morale of the individual soldier.
2. They provided instruction in the historical consensus of values of the American culture.
3. They provided a healthy forum for airing behavior-oriented problems thus providing an early warning system to the commander.²⁸

Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program

The chaplaincy was one of the first to take action on alcohol and drug abuse problems within the Army. Then Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (MG) Francis L. Sampson, as a member of the personal and special staff of the Chief of Staff of the Army, made a visit to southeast Asia in 1968. Following this visit Chaplain Sampson directed Army chaplains to conduct daylong training workshops throughout the Army on drug and alcohol as part of the chaplain's monthly training program in order to address immediately this critical problem.²⁹

Greater command emphasis was to follow. President Richard M. Nixon in a message to Congress on 17 June 1971 requested additional funds for drug control programs.³⁰ Following this the Secretary of Defense ordered the Service Secretaries to begin plans to control drug abuse. The response by the Army was AR 600-85, the Army's Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program. The result of this program was the Alcohol and Drug Prevention Team. By this time many commanders realized that due to Chaplain Sampson's initiative, chaplains were the

most highly skilled professionals to work in this area. When the alcohol and drug prevention teams were formed commanders insisted that chaplains be members of these teams. As a result, eighty-one spaces were allocated (by DA-DCSPER) for chaplains on these teams.³¹

Keeping in mind that Chaplain (MG) Gerhardt W. Hyatt was a member of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams' personal staff, the importance of the chaplain's position on the personal staff is shown by the following quotes.

As Chaplain (COL) Harold C. Lamm, former Executive Director of the Armed Forces Chaplains Board and presently First US Army Chaplain stated:

Many of these broad programs which grew out of this period were based on perceptions of where the Army was and what needed to be done as viewed by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams, and Chaplain (MG) Hyatt's involvement with him as a member of his personal staff; and where the rest of the Army Staff was in dealing with many of these problems.

If the chaplain would have been just represented in that situation through the DA-DCSPER without direct communication and direct involvement (with the commander) many of the opportunities, I'm convinced, would not have taken place. The DA-DCSPER would not have had the insight or sensitivity to see some of those issues really having the religious or spiritual roots that they do have, which the chaplain did by virtue of who he or she is.³²

The following excerpt from an interview with Chaplain (MG) Orris E. Kelly, former Chief of Chaplains, reemphasizes the chaplain's role in the Drug and Alcohol Program:

When I became Chaplain Hyatt's Executive Officer (4 September 1973) the Army had just established, under BG Bobby Gard, the job of focusing for the Army a way to look at the Drug and Alcohol Program, and to work on it.

Will Hyatt said to me: 'You are going over to work for Bobby Gard for a while, you are going to be on loan. You'll do the job here (DACH, as XO), but go over and work with Bobby Gard.' So Gard and I went over to one of the committees on Capitol Hill and discussed with the staffers what the Army was going to do about the Drug and Alcohol Program. Then I came back with the mandate of finding, someplace in the United States, a program that could fit the Army need to educate around drug and alcohol abuse. So I visited several institutions . . . out of the whole discussion we recommended that the Army use the Yale program. Much discussion over this on the Hill, but sold the program as being the model that was needed in the Army. So our (the Army Chaplaincy) involvement at that particular point was around Drug and Alcohol Training Centers and helping write the educational program in that area for the Army at that time.³³

Personal Effectiveness Training (P.E.T.)

The PET Program was initiated by the chaplaincy to assist commanders in improving the quality of junior officer and noncommissioned officer leadership and to deal legitimately and openly with human issues, ethical and social concerns of soldiers. It was a logical follow on to the Human Self Development Program, only now the needs as identified by the chaplain to the commander and the commander to the chaplain centered around the enhancement of junior officer and noncommissioned officer leadership skills.

This program was initiated by Chaplain (MG) Gerhardt W. Hyatt, Chief of Chaplains, who stated in an interview that:

General Fulton heard my speech at FT Benning on 'Human Self Development and the Enlightened Leader,' and was impressed. The whole ideal of enlightened leadership came from the Chaplaincy. It would never have surfaced through the staff if the chaplain could not have gotten directly to the commander.³⁴

Referring to this same speech Chaplain (COL) Charles F. Kriete, former Commandant, US Army Chaplain Center and School and US Army War College faculty member, commented in an interview:

Chaplain Hyatt gave a speech at FT Benning on a study done by Scott Cunningham at Harvard on 'Why Soldiers Join the Army;' Chaplain Hyatt got four standing ovations. General Abrams heard about the speech before Chaplain Hyatt got back to Washington. That was the beginning of the Personal Effectiveness Program (PET) because Chaplain Hyatt directed me to get with the DA-DCSPER. I got with the DA-DCSPER Leadership Director and I wrote the letter that General Rogers (DA-DCSPER) signed to authorize chaplains to work on the PET Program.³⁵

The following is extracted from the 1 October 1973, Chief of Chaplains Newsletter:

One of the most significant opportunities for providing pastoral ministry to the Army system has resulted from a request by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel for assistance in developing the junior leadership of the Army. Because he felt that the Chaplaincy has the best trained group of counselors in the Army today, and because chaplains traditionally have worked closely with commanders on the personal and morale problems of soldiers, General Rogers asked that we accept the mission of training company commanders and noncommissioned officers in effective counseling techniques. Our efforts in carrying out this mission are being implemented through a program called Personal Effectiveness Training.³⁶

Command emphasis and implementation of this program is most evident in a letter dated 10 December 1973, subject, Personal Effectiveness Training, from General W. E. DePuy, the TRADOC Commander, to, Commanders, TRADOC Installations:

At our recent Commanders' Conference much time was spent discussing the critical state of our personnel resources. During this critical time it is of paramount importance that we manage these resources with maximum effectiveness. Therefore, I want you to thoroughly investigate the potential of Personal Effectiveness Training at your installation.

Recognizing that some of these difficulties could be resolved by training in leadership counseling, I requested assistance through DCSPER, DA, from the Chief of Chaplains, MG Hyatt.

I have been assured that your installation chaplain is thoroughly familiar with this command program and is capable of supporting it.

Limited testing of this concept has already been conducted at FT Knox, FT Leonard Wood and the Sergeants Major Academy indicating very positive potential. I believe you should implement this PET as a part of your leadership program . . . I look for your initial evaluation of this program in April 1974.³⁷

An indication that programs which meet Army needs will be further implemented and supported as long as they are functional and effective is seen in a CSA Memo for the Director of the Army Staff, dated 13 November 1976, which reads:

17. The Personal Effectiveness Training (PET) conducted by our Chaplains has been very useful and well received. Do we have similar instruction on interpersonal relationships in PNCOC/BNCOC? If not--and I don't believe we do--develop a plan to get it in and have proponent discuss with me. (Chaplain Kelly indicated to me that the chaplains could assist.)³⁸

Family Life and Quality of Life

The Army Chaplaincy, from its very beginning, has been involved in Family Life and Quality of Life issues. However, it was the twist of events arising from the drug and alcohol problems of the 1970's that caused a finer focus on family life. "The 'drug problem' has forced us to become increasingly involved in other significant human problems-- race relations, family life problems, conflicting value systems and life styles. . . ."³⁹ Chaplain (COL) John C. Scott, former Director of

Plans, Policies and Programs at the Office Chief of Chaplains (DACH) and presently the USA WESTCOM Chaplain, stated in an interview:

Family Life had high visibility under Chaplain Orris Kelly. DACH saw family life as a critical issue in the Army and an area in which chaplains needed to be very involved. Later on DA-DCSPER and the DAAG, became more involved in family issues. DACH position was that the Chaplaincy brought a theological and spiritual dimension to this family life need that no other (Army agency) could meet.⁴⁰

A synopsis of this philosophy is found in the DACH Policies and Precedents, number 14, dated 31 March 1980:

A Family Life Center begins with and operates from a theological base and focuses on ministry to families with a particular emphasis on relationship issues. As a pastoral model focusing on reconciliation, problem prevention, family education and enrichment, it reaches out to the total community.⁴¹

Ministry Within the Educational Institutions of the Army

In an attempt to enable the leadership of the Army to understand the young soldier better and meet the needs of the commander, the Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (MG) Francis L. Sampson, advocated extensive use of qualified chaplains on the faculties of major Army training institutions as instructors in the areas of moral sensitivity and human relations. The Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (MG) Gerhardt W. Hyatt, selected two exceptionally qualified and experienced senior chaplains, Chaplain (COL) Albert F. Ledebuhr and Chaplain (COL) Ben S. Price, as post chaplains at FT Benning and FT Knox respectively. In assigning them, the Chief of Chaplains confirmed in writing to the commanders concerned in May 1970: "If you choose to use (the chaplain concerned) in such a dual role (as instructor and post chaplain), I would interpose no objection."⁴²

Chaplain Ledebuhr, former USAREUR Chaplain and former TRADOC Chaplain, in an interview made the following comment:

Out of that came a whole development of the use of the chaplain in the educational institutions of the Army. It never would have flown if it had to go through the DPCA. When I went to FT Benning I was under the DPCA for the first few months and finally went to General Talbot and told him of my mission of getting a chaplain space on the Infantry School Faculty and that under the present structure could not get it done. The result was that General Talbot took the Chaplain section out from under the DPCA and put it under the Chief of Staff. It was that simple.⁴³

The success of that mission led to the eventual establishment of chaplain spaces on the faculties of all the Army service schools.

As curriculum advisors and platform instructors, chaplains have established a significant place in the educational milieu of service schools. They provide expertise in those aspects of training which deal with the ethics of decision making, moral stamina, value education and interpersonal relationships. Additionally, chaplains are having a strong influence on training at NCO Academies and other enlisted training schools.⁴⁴

The pluralistic nature of American society is mirrored in the Army. There is always a "tension" between individual needs and the institutional needs of the Army. There is no way to eliminate this tension. Indeed, there is a healthiness in it. To place the chaplain under the DA-DCSPER/DCSPER/DPCA/G-1 is to make the chaplain a captive of his own success and reduce the capacity for innovation. Most of the programs described have been integrated into the Army system because of their proven value during chaplain pioneering programs (e.g., drugs/alcohol/counseling/human relations/OE/OD/ethics.) Chaplains were able to develop these programs because of their position as a nondirectorate personal and special staff officer--a position which was sufficiently autonomous to allow innovation and quick response to the perceived needs of individuals and the Army system.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH FINDINGS

SUMMARY

US Army chaplains are unique Army officers. They are full time members of a nonmilitary institution--the church/synagogue and fully part of the Army. This duality allows them to minister to individuals and the institution. They are a conduit of information from commanders to soldiers and vice versa. The chaplain's ministry is a varied people oriented, proactive ministry. It's success is based in large part on the separate, nondirectorate staff status it maintains at installation and higher levels. This enables the free flow of information to commanders; allows immediate problem solving initiatives to be tried by chaplains; and while maintaining official staff status provides for a recognition of individual values in the midst of institutional values.

The value and effectiveness of the chaplain would be lost to the Army if any other staff elements were interposed between the commander and the chaplain. The free flow of information would be stopped and vital data needed by the commander in fulfilling his responsibilities in the area of religion, moral and ethical leadership would be unnecessarily filtered.

There is a need for a "nonstandardized" element in dealing with individuals and institutions. The chaplain as personal or special staff officer is that element in the Army. All the evidence in this study negates the degree of effectiveness of any staff status other than the personal or special staff for the chaplain.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the findings of this study it is concluded that:

1. Chaplains are a "one of a kind" officer loyal to two institutions.
2. The Chaplain as a personal or special staff officer has opportunities to minister to the Army as a total institution and to the individual soldier.
3. Placing the chaplain under the DA-DCSPER/DCSPER/DPCA/G-1 would negatively effect chaplain ministry and limit the range of creative Army people programs.
4. There is no evidence to prove that the chaplain would be more effective or the Army better served if the chaplain were "under" the DA-DCSPER/DCSPER/DPCS/G-1.
5. Being an effective member of the commander's personal or special staff requires a proactive, creative approach toward ministry.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommend that:

1. The study be forwarded to the Office Chief of Chaplains, DA-DCSPER, US Army Chaplain Center and School, US Army Chaplains Board, to provide data in any further action on this subject.
2. That all individuals who were interviewed be provided a copy of this study.
3. Copies of the audio-tape interviews be forwarded to the US Army Chaplain Center and School for inclusion in their Oral History Program.

ENDNOTES

1. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 10-5, para 2-35 (hereafter referred to as "AR 10-5").
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3. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 5-3, para 4-3 (hereafter referred to as "AR 5-3").
4. OCCH Historical Review, 1 July 1965 to 31 December 1966, p. 48.
5. OCCH Historical Review, 1 January 1967 to 30 June 1968, pp. 138-139.
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11. Letter from General Walter L. Kerwin, Jr., Commander US Army Forces Command, subject, Draft AR 10-10, dated 5 July 1974.
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13. Memorandum for LTG Thurman (DA-DCSPER) from Comptroller of the Army, subject, Installation DCSPER Organization Concept, dated 15 June 1983.
14. Ibid.
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16. George H. Williams, "The Chaplaincy in the Armed Forces of the United States of America in Historical and Ecclesiastical Perspective," in Military Chaplains, from a Religious Military to a Military Religion. Ed. by Harvey G. Cox, Jr., p. 57.

17. Richard G. Hutcheson, Jr., The Churches and the Chaplaincy, p. 50.
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23. Ibid., p. 40.
24. Ibid., p. 41.
25. Luther D. Miller, "Moral Effects of Military Service," Army and Navy Chaplain, July-August 1945, p. 11.
26. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-30, para 1 (hereafter referred to as "AR 600-30").
27. OCCH Historical Review, 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973, p. 103.
28. DA Office Chief of Chaplains paper on, Influence of Character Guidance on the Image of the Army.
29. OCCH Historical Review, 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969, p. 105.
30. Richard M. Nixon, President's Message on Drug Control Programs, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. XXVII, p. 94-A.
31. OCCH Historical Review, 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974, p. 32ff.
32. Interview with Ch (COL) Harold C. Lamm, USA, HQ First US Army, Ft. George G. Meade, 11 January 1984.
33. Interview with Ch (MG) Orris E. Kelly, USA, (Ret.), Brentwood, TN, 16 January 1984.
34. Interview with Ch (MG) Gerhardt W. Hyatt, USA (Ret.), St. Louis, MO, 17 January 1984.
35. Interview with Ch (COL) Charles F. Kriete, USA (Ret.), Carlisle, PA, 11 January 1984.

36. Monthly Newsletter, DA Office Chief of Chaplains, 1 October 1973.
37. General W. E. DePuy, CG TRADOC, letter to Commanders, TRADOC Installations, subject, Personal Effectiveness Training, dated 10 December 1973.
38. CSA Memo for DSA, 17 November 1976.
39. OCCH Historical Review, 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973, p. 61.
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ACRONYM AND ABBREVIATION LIST

<u>ACRONYM</u>	<u>DEFINITION</u>
ACS	ARMY COMMUNITY SERVICES
ARSTAF.	ARMY STAFF
AWC	ARMY WAR COLLEGE
AWOL.	ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE
BNCOC	BASIC NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER COURSE
CAC	COMBINED ARMS CENTER
CALCAV.	CLERGY AND LAITY CONCERNED ABOUT VIETNAM
CCH	CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
CG.	COMMANDING GENERAL
CH.	CHAPLAIN
CIMS.	CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES ARMY INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT STUDY
COA	COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
CONARC.	CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND
CONUS	CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
CPE	CLINICAL PASTORAL EDUCATION
CPO	CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICER
CS.	CHIEF OF STAFF
CSA	CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
DA.	DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
D&A	DRUG AND ALCOHOL
DAAG.	DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ADJUTANT GENERAL
DACH.	DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, OFFICE CHIEF OF ARMY CHAPLAINS

DA-DCSPER DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
 STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
 DCSPER. DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
 DOD DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 DPCA. DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL AND COMMUNITY
 ACTIVITIES
 EEOO. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY OFFICER
 FORSCOM US ARMY FORCES COMMAND
 HUMRO HUMAN RESOURCES ORGANIZATION
 HSD HUMAN SELF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
 JAG JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
 LET LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS TRAINING
 MACOM MAJOR ARMY COMMAND
 MVA MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY
 NCO NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER
 NTL NATIONAL TRAINING LABORATORY
 OCCH. OFFICE CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
 OD. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
 OE. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
 PET PERSONAL EFFECTIVENESS TRAINING
 PNCOC PRIMARY NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER COURSE
 PPP PLANS, PROGRAMS AND POLICIES
 RETO. REVIEW OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR
 OFFICERS
 ROTC. RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS
 RVN REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
 SSC SOLDIER SUPPORT CENTER
 TRADOC. US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
 TSURG THE SURGEON GENERAL

USACHCS US ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL
USAREUR US ARMY EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY
UMT UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING
VCSA. VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
XO. EXECUTIVE OFFICER


ANNEX I

ANNEX I: ORGANIZATION CHARTS (STEADFAST)

Annex I contains Organization Charts of TRADOC, FORSCOM and CONUS Army Headquarters as included in Operation STEADFAST Historical Summary: A History of the Reorganization of the US Continental Army Command (1972-1973), pages 138, 140, 199.

A copy of this document is in the USAWC Library.


HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND




^a ALSO PERSONAL STAFF OF CG

^b UNDER OP CON DCS ROTC

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCE COMMAND



REVISED ORGANIZATION FOR CONUS ARMY HEADQUARTERS



^a ALSO IS THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMY READINESS REGION COLLOCATED WITH THE CONUS ARMY HEADQUARTERS.
^b MEMBERS OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL'S PERSONAL STAFF.

ANNEX II

ANNEX II: CIMS REPORT EXCERPT

Annex II contains excerpted material from CONUS CONARC INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT EVALUATION (CIMS) prepared by the Office, Comptroller of the Army, 16 April 1973. It is taken from Section III. Detailed Evaluation, C. Personnel, 7. Organization of the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities and Staff Regulations, (e) Chaplain, pages 46 through 55.

It also contains the Chief of Chaplains nonconcurrence to the CONUS CONARC INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT EVALUATION (Annex II pages 56, 57).

(e) Chaplain

1. Although the questionnaires which were directed to HQ CONARC, the CONUS Armies and Class I installations did not address the staffing relationship of the Office of the Chaplain, the study group did conduct a review in this area during the six installation visits. In addition to these visits, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains issued a questionnaire to Class I installation Chaplains and provided the results of this inquiry to the study group.

2. An analysis of the responses to the questionnaire of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains indicates that the Installation Chaplains feel basically the same as the Provost Marshal, CPO, and EE00. The installation staff chaplains who have operated under the CIMS concept feel that the staff chaplain should be on the personal staff or special staff as a separate organizational entity, rather than being under the DPCA. Some of the reasons offered by the installation chaplains are as follows:

a. Placing the Chaplain on the staff of the DPCA has hampered free and fast communication with the Commander and other staff officers. The professional advice and judgement of the Chaplain has frequently been negated by this organizational posture and in their opinion has jeopardized the unique and traditional role of the Chaplain. In the view of the chaplains, this cripples the soundness of the commander's decisions in matters of religion, moral responsibility and human relations.

b. By the existence of this chain of command, Installation Chaplains feel compelled to keep the DPCA informed on all matters they wish to discuss or have discussed with the Commander,

Deputy Commander and/or Chief of Staff. This, it was pointed out, can become extremely awkward since the Chaplain often becomes involved in delicate personal or family situations. In these cases, interposing of the DPCA complicates and at times confuses solutions which could otherwise be handled quietly, discreetly, and in ways that would save embarrassment to the Army or the installation.

c. Placing the chaplain on the staff of the DPCA has caused the chaplain to be submerged in a staff organization which is unable to speak for the chaplain on religious programs except in the simplest and most superficial manner. This organization, it was indicated, tends to encourage other staff members to deal with the DPCA instead of the chaplain in matters pertaining to the religious program and the moral dimensions of leadership and human relations. Staff chaplains feel that this staff layer hinders the chaplain in his access to other staff officers as well as the commander.

d. The Chaplains feel, as do the Provost Marshal, CPO, and EE00, that their official organizational relationship to the commander should rest on the merits of a feasible structure rather than on such tenuous and uncertain factors as individual personalities, likes, or dislikes. In some cases the chaplain (as was the case of the Provost Marshal) outranks the DPCA and this causes an awkward situation. (This is because the criteria for establishing the grade of the chaplain are different from that used for establishing installation directors' grades.)

3. The results of the staff visits to the installation chaplains reflected essentially the same concerns as had been brought out in the responses to the Chief of Chaplains inquiry discussed

above. It was also discovered, however, that, generally, the Staff Chaplains enjoy greater freedom for use of the special staff relationships than other officers, except perhaps the Provost Marshal. However, these relationships can be partially attributable to tradition and/or personal working relationships.

4. Although a specific question on the organizational placement of the staff chaplain was not included in the questionnaire sent to the installations, this matter was discussed with the installation commanders and/or Chiefs of Staff during the staff visits. The answers provided by these commanders and/or Chiefs of Staff generally parallel the answers provided on the Provost Marshal. The amount of access that the staff chaplain has to the commander and/or Chief of Staff was dependent on the desires of the commander and/or Chief of Staff regardless of what the CIMS organizational structure indicated. Some staff chaplains have free access to the commander and/or Chief of Staff. In another case the installation commander prefers to work with the deputy chaplain. During the briefings of this study to one DA staff agency, a case was reported to the study team whereby a staff chaplain told a prospective DPCA that he (staff chaplain) would prefer to work for this DPCA. Although organizational structure cannot be based solely on personalities, this factor is one that cannot be completely overlooked. Since the opinions of installation commanders and/or Chiefs of Staff varied on the organizational placement of the staff chaplain (as occurred with the other staff officers previously discussed) and since it is the installation commander who is ultimately responsible for the installation mission, it should be the installation commander who determines the organizational placement of the staff chaplain. Changing paragraph 12 of AR 10-10 on Special Staff Relationships as previously

discussed would grant the installation commander this authority and allow him to determine where the Chaplain should be placed in order to accomplish the installation mission.

(f) Summary and Final Discussion.

1. A review of the discussion on Special Staff relationships indicates considerable differences of opinion exist on where these officers who require direct and immediate access to the commander should be placed in the organizational structure. Generally, the individual officers (Provost Marshal, CPO, EE00, Chaplain) feel that they should be on the commander's personal or special staff. The commands response to the installation questionnaire and conversations with installation commanders and/or Chiefs of Staff reflect divergent opinions. In the opinion of the commanders and/or Chiefs of Staff some officers should report direct to the commander while other officers should remain under the DPCA. However, opinions vary as to which officers should report direct and which ones should be under the DPCA.

2. The arguments offered by the individual officers, installation commanders and/or Chiefs of Staff concerning Special Staff relationships during the course of the study all have considerable merit. It was apparent from installation visits that everyone was doing their best in accomplishing the mission. The suggestions to change the special staff relationships were made in an attempt to establish a better organizational structure which would help rather than hinder accomplishing the mission.

3. In determining a workable solution to these special staff relationships, consideration must also be given to other officers, that were not specifically discussed above, who may require

direct and immediate access to the commander. For example, the Procurement Officer and/or Family Housing Officer might require certain access to the commander within their areas of responsibility.

4. Presently, paragraph 12 of AR 10-10 addresses these special staff relationships, but considerable doubt exists concerning the installation commanders authority in this area. For example, the regulation is not clear on the authority of the installation commander to establish separate staff offices for those officers he wants reporting directly to him. Visits to the installations indicated, however, that several commanders had established these special staff offices regardless of the intent of paragraph 12, AR 10-10. Although these offices might not appear in official organization charts, they do in fact exist. In the words of several installation commanders, they would establish whatever relationships they consider necessary to accomplish the mission.

5. From this discussion, it is apparent that any organizational structure for those officers who require direct and immediate access to the commander, that is directed, would not satisfy every individual involved. Even if such an organizational structure could be devised, then the desires of the commander would require modifications to the structure. Since such a structure cannot be devised, it appears that the installation commander, who is ultimately responsible for accomplishment of the installation mission, should have the final authority to determine the organizational placement of these officers since it is he who has to answer higher headquarters. Changing paragraph 12 of AR 10-10 to clarify the installation commanders authority in establishing separate staff offices would give the commander this

authority. This change would allow the installation commander to establish those separate staff offices he considered necessary and would also permit establishment of those relationships that are best suited for that installation and accomplishment of the mission. This recommendation is also in agreement with the remainder of the recommendations in this study. Numerous recommendations have been made in this study to grant the installation commander greater flexibility in managing his installation by removing many of the organizational restrictions presently imposed. Thus any recommendations that would dictate an organizational structure for these officers who require direct and immediate access to the commander would be contradictory to the remainder of the recommendations in this study.

b. Conclusions

(1) The DPCA at many large installations has an excessive span of control, is supervising too many diverse functions and is carrying too heavy a workload. Consideration should be given to dividing these functions of the DPCA into two separate and distinct directorates as discussed in paragraph 7a(1)(d) above, with alignment of functions as shown therein. However, this separation of the DPCA might not apply in all cases, particularly at some smaller installations where the size of the activity does not justify two separate directorates. The decision to establish these directorates should be at the discretion of CONARC if ACSFOR determines this division feasible.

(2) Organizational structure of the DPCA, patterned after that of DA DCSPER, does not necessarily work at installation level. Policymaking and policy execution are two greatly different matters. Span of control of the DPCA is too broad and related workload is too heavy.

(3) Certain staff officers such as the Chaplain, Civilian Personnel Officer, Provost Marshal, and Equal Employment Opportunity Officer are required by regulations to act for the commander in certain areas and have direct access to the Commander in these certain areas of interest. This requires the commander to establish "Special Staff Relationships."

(4) Some staff officers require direct and immediate access to the commander in their respective areas of interest.

(5) Paragraph 12 of AR 10-10 on Special Staff Relationships apparently causes confusion at some installations on the latitude provided the Installation Commander in establishing these relationships particularly the authority to establish separate staff offices. This confusion is caused because one part of this regulation states:

"12. Special Staff Relationships. This regulation is not intended to restrain, and may not be used to restrain, establishing or maintaining those special staff relationships that are often required outside the normal chain of command or staff responsibilities. Such relationships may be prescribed by law, Army regulations, or specific interests of the commander.

a. Special relationships may involve authorizing direct access to the commander, deputy commander, and/or Chief of Staff by certain staff offices on specific subjects, e.g. the chaplain, provost marshal, civilian personnel officer, housing officer.----."

However, later in this same paragraph, the regulation states:

"b. The finite relationship between staff elements will be clearly and precisely prescribed by installation

commanders in the form of a formal memorandum, staff operations manual, organization and functions regulation, or similar document. Such document will prescribe the limits of autonomy accorded staff elements, but may not in any degree contravene the directorate staff concepts and structure prescribed by this regulation." (Underlining added by study team.)

(6) The Special Staff relationships, as envisioned in paragraph 12, AR 10-10 exist in varying degrees throughout CONUS Class I Installations. For example, relationships between the commander and the Chaplain, Provost Marshal, Civilian Personnel Officer, and Equal Employment Opportunity Officer range from official recognition as a member of the commander's personal staff to virtually complete subordination under the DPCA. In some cases these officers do not have the direct and immediate access to the commander necessary to perform their job.

(7) The DPCA's ability to supervise effectively some staff officers in his organization is negated by the fact that, in certain cases, he is junior in rank to the Provost Marshal and Chaplain.

(8) Generally, the Chaplains, Provost Marshals, CPOs and EEOOs who require direct and immediate access to the commander feel they should have separate staff office recognition and should not be placed under the DPCA.

(9) The installation's command response to the questionnaire used in the evaluation and conversations with installation commanders and/or Chiefs of Staff differ on where these staff officers should be placed in the organizational structure.

(10) Any recommendation on special staff relationships must address all staff offices (not only those under the DPCA) who may require access to the commander.

(11) The installation commander is ultimately responsible for accomplishment of the installation mission.

c. Recommendations

(1) That consideration be given to dividing the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities into two separate and distinct directorates at larger installations with alignment of functions as follows:

<u>DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES</u>	<u>DIRECTOR OF COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES</u>
a. HQ Administration	a. Special Services
b. Military Personnel Administration	b. Army Community Services
c. Military Educational Development (Includes Civilian Educational for Military Personnel)	c. Post Exchange
d. Equal Opportunity (Military)	d. Clubs and Messes
*e. Equal Employment Opportunity	e. Other Non-Appropriated Fund Activities
	f. Safety
	g. Morale and Welfare
	h. Drug and Alcohol Abuse

*Should be provided direct access to the commander.

This division of the DPCA is not considered mandatory and might not apply, particularly, where the size of the activity does not justify two separate directorates. The decision to establish these Directorates at the smaller installations should be at the discretion of CONARC if ACSFOR determines this division feasible. If the Commander desires, the Chaplain, CPO and Provost Marshal may be required to report through a Director. The CPO would be organizationally located under the Director of Administrative and Personnel Services and the Provost Marshal and

Chaplain organizationally located under the Director of Community Activities (these officers require special staff relationship). (ACSFOR in coordination with DCSPER/TAG/CONARC.)

(2) To eliminate misunderstanding, revise paragraph 12, AR 10-10, to provide that the installation commander should be permitted to establish special staff relationships with the Chaplain, Provost Marshal and Civilian Personnel Officer and may establish such relationships with others if he so desires. In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Officer should be provided direct access to the Commander due to the sensitivity of his function. These Special Staff Office relationships should be recognized in the standardized organization. (ACSFOR)

(3) That AR 20-20 be revised to reflect the above recommended changes. (ACSFOR)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Chief of Chaplains
Washington, DC 20314

DACH-PPE

7 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: CONUS CONARC Installation Management Evaluation

1. Nonconcur for the following reasons:

a. "Permitting" the installation commander "to establish special staff relationships with the Chaplain, Provost Marshal and Civilian Personnel Officer" and "recognizing" these and other special staff relationships in the standardized organization does a disservice to the commander by failing to recognize the unique function of the chaplain at the installation level.

(1) There is no staff position in the Army parallel to that of the chaplain, due to the right of privileged communication guaranteed soldiers by the Manual for Courts Martial, para 151b. His function is not comparable to that of any other officer, a fact attested to by AR 165-20, para 3a, which outlines the privileged communication requirement, and the right of direct access to commanders which is required by AR 165-20, para 2c.

(2) Because soldiers take the status of the chaplain so seriously, he is privy to information no other element of the command possesses, and is in a position to judge the state of morale in the command as no one else can. He has been specially trained to use this status to identify serious problems and trends in their early ages.

(3) The post chaplain, through an exception to the use of authorized channels established by AR 165-20, para 3g, exercises professional supervision over all installation chaplains, who have an influence over the lives of members of the command which is also unique in the army. This gives him resources with which to provide the commander a confidential and professional estimate of the community climate which is not available to any other staff element. Therefore the commander has a strong vested interest in the chaplain's activities.

7 June 1973

SUBJECT: CONUS CONARC Installation Management Evaluation

b. A change in the CIMS structure is required to make maximum use of the installation chaplain's unique resources.

(1) Placing the chaplain in the DPCA or Director of Communities Activities organization, even with the right of direct access when required, puts him in a position which divides his loyalties and complicates his relationship to the other staff elements, to the commander's disadvantage. Any structure which permits the interposition of other staff elements between chaplain and commander restricts the free flow of information and filters data which the commander needs for sound command decisions on moral responsibility, morale, and religion. A classic example is My Lai.

(2) The CIMS study acknowledges that numerous structural problems exist in chaplain operations under the current arrangements. Based on the experience factor of chaplains operating under CIMS since 1970 and a 1972 survey of CONUS installation staff chaplains, the Chief of Chaplains recommend to the study group that the chaplain be listed as a non-directorate position on the personal staff of the commander. This recommendation was not incorporated into the study.

c. The draft revision of AR 10-10 developed by CONARC in connection with CONUS reorganization and recently forwarded to HQDA for staffing lists the chaplain as a non-directorate position on the commander's personal staff. This change in structure is in harmony with CONUS Reorganization objectives to streamline management and avoid layering. Furthermore, the commander would retain all the flexibility he desires, since commanders traditionally use members of their personal staff in the manner or to the extent which they themselves wish.

2. RECOMMENDATION: That the staff chaplain be listed as a non-directorate position in paragraph 10, AR 10-10, on the commander's personal staff.

GERHARDT W. HYATT
Chaplain (Major General), USA
Chief of Chaplains

ANNEX III

ANNEX III: INSTALLATION DCSPER ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

Annex III contains the latest DA-DCSPER proposed installation DA-DCSPER Organization (pages 60 through 66) and excerpted responses dealing specifically with the "Chaplain under DCSPER issue." These replies begin at page 67 and are representative of the MACOM responses regarding the chaplain's status.

At page 69 and following the WESTCOM Chaplain's response to the WESTCOM DCSPER regarding the DA-DCSPER Organizational Concept is included. It includes all arguments presented by other MACOM chaplains and more.

Chief of chaplain's response is at pages 73 through 75.

Pages 76 through 83 should be read for understanding of correct resolution of the staff position of the Chaplain.

The complete file on this action to include original proposal, responses, and other related material is in the permanent files of the Office, Chief of Chaplains, Department of the Army.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Washington, DC 20310

DAPE-HRL

10 June 1983

SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. Commanders at all levels have placed considerable emphasis on improving personnel and community activities support of soldiers and their families within available resources. Data monitored at HQDA shows that heightened attention to facility and support program improvement has paid dividends in better morale and job satisfaction. Contributing to this progress has been establishment of procedures to assess the quality of support programs and the resources that should be devoted to them as outlined by the "DA Minimum Standards Handbook" and resourcing guidelines which have been included in HQDA program and budget documents. Concurrently, DPCA and SI courses were established to significantly increase our instruction about soldier and family support programs.
2. While these initiatives have been successful in the short term, they have not completely succeeded in delivering consistent and uniform support programs throughout the Army. While inadequate resourcing has played a part, the lack of consistency and uniformity have also contributed to our inability to deliver the quality of services and programs our soldiers expect and deserve. A major barrier to this goal is the lack of commonality between Army installations and community staffs. In summary, it is extremely difficult to develop an adequate training program and resource it properly if the structure and functions of the organization do not lend themselves to it.
3. As a first step in sorting out this issue, the DCSPER asked the Soldier Support Center to convene a doctrine and proponent workshop with representatives of many of the major commands and several successful installation and community DPCAs. This workshop identified needed doctrine, organizational structure and training that the Army will need in this area in the future. After review by Soldier Support Center, an organizational model was developed. This model features the general and special staff relationships of the TOE Army and establishes the DCSPER or G1 as the planner and coordinator, and the special staff as the manager and operator of the installation and community personnel management and community activity programs. A more detailed description of this concept is enclosed.

DAPE-HRL

10 June 1983

SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

4. The review of the personnel and community activities arena is but one part of an overall examination of the installation support structure. The Comptroller of the Army will be coordinating the remainder of the installation functional areas in conjunction with the various proponents. It is expected that a model will be developed that can be modified by the MACOMs to suit geographic or mission unique requirements.

5. Request your review and comment on the proposed structure for the personnel and community activities area by 15 August 1983. HQDA point of contact is MAJ(P) Barry A. Berglund, AV 227-6961.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

1 Encl
as

JOHN H. MITCHELL
Major General, GS
Director of Human Resources
Development

DISTRIBUTION:

Cdr, USA FORSCOM
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Cdr, US Army Criminal Investigation Command
Cdr, US Army Health Services Command
Cdr, US Army Europe and Seventh Army
CG, Eighth US Army
CG, US Army Western Command
Cdr, US Army Corps of Engineers, European Div.
Cdr, US Army Communications Command

AN ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT FOR
INSTALLATION AND COMMUNITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

I. Background.

1. Over time the Army has developed an array of people support programs to meet the needs of Soldiers and their families. These have evolved from comparatively simple programs primarily to support single Soldiers to complex programs supporting families; from programs largely limited to installation boundaries to programs integrated with the support activities of local communities; and, from programs funded totally by appropriated funds to programs funded wholly or partially by nonappropriated funds and volunteer workers. As the Army evolved to a married-Army, Soldiers and their families came to expect the same general type support programs at installations or communities wherever they were stationed. If this consistency does not exist, the perception that "the Army does not take care of its own" is inevitable.

2. Throughout this evolution, each new initiative has been added to the installation command and control structure and absorbed within existing management systems. In many cases programs were absorbed within the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities while others were added outside the commander's door to provide visibility or to assure success through commander emphasis. As a result the structure for managing personnel and community support programs is not consistent nor standard. This inconsistency forces training programs to be generic--to apply throughout the Army--or be designed to specifically meet local needs. Because training is generalized, many graduating students find that their duties and local procedures are vastly different than those taught in the "school house."

3. This concept addresses all three challenges: organizational standardization, program consistency, and individual training.

II. General.

1. This concept includes the general and special staff organizational relationship of the Army TOE structure: the general staff plans, coordinates and supervises; and the special staff manages and operates. Therefore the general staff acts for and on behalf of the commander and unlike the "director staff" of the present installation model, is not an operator. This distinction is critical as this concept considers that CER evaluation procedures or parent unit relationships are outside the concept. For example, the religious ministry at an installation can be coordinated with other support programs by the ACofS, G1 although the chaplain could be a colonel and the G1 a lieutenant colonel. Similarly

the medical support of the installation can be coordinated by the G1 although the MEDDAC commander is assigned to Health Services Command. In each of these cases the OER scheme could be outside the immediate personnel and community activities support organization.

2. The concept also presumes that each functional program manager need not report directly to the commander to assure success of the program. In many cases direct access to the commander is directed or implied by HQDA guidance. Each of these programs is being reviewed at ODCSPER HQDA to remove this constraint. However, this does not mean that the commander does not have direct access to the program directors wherever located structurally, nor should the program director be denied an expert-advisor relationship with the commander.

3. Major commanders would be authorized to approve minor deviations from the standardized structure to accommodate unique conditions or resource availability, provided consistency within the MACOM is retained.

III. Organizational Standardization.

1. A conceptual organizational diagram is at TAB A.

a. The balloons describe the major functions of the adjacent functional block. In some cases functions have been realigned from current practices to gain a better logical grouping or for uniformity.

b. The SC shown above various blocks indicates the probable officer specialty code associated with those functions.

c. The DCSPER (A) is the general staff planner, coordinator and supervisor of the special staff managers and operators.

d. The empty boxes (B) indicates other general staff officers comparable to the DCSPER.

e. The ACS Civ Pers (C) is the present Civilian Personnel Officer and is part of the special staff. The structure shown is that now outlined in CPR 200.

f. The ACS Pers and Admin (D) is the special staff coordinator of the activities shown. However, the chiefs of these activities retain special staff status and in some instances the ACS P&A reverts to general staff status. This notion is explained later.

g. The ACS Cmty Act (E) manages the community activity programs shown. The Business Advisor (F) is a new position who oversees the profitability of the various nonappropriated fund activities and analyzes the probable business outcomes of changes in services, expenses or income. The Business Advisor is key to achieving self-sufficiency at the installation level. The Resource Management Division (G) is the present Morale Support Fund Custodian with responsibility for synchronizing appropriated fund support and NAF income and expenses. This element works in close coordination with the Business Advisor, the installation resource manager and the installation facilities managers.

The Community Support and Services Division (H) includes the Alcohol and Drug Control Program and a merged Equal Opportunity and Equal Employment Opportunity Program. (This merger is being reviewed at HQDA.) The Support Division (I) centralizes logistical activities and adds a capability for marketing and advertising community support programs.

2. Adaptations of this model at various types of installations and communities are at Tab B.

a. At a Division or Corps Installation (Riley, Carson, Polk, Ord, Lewis) (A), the ACofS PA is the Division G1 and the staff includes a merger of installation and division functions. Upon deployment of the combat division (or corps at Lewis) the installation converts to the model shown at (B) and the Division G1 becomes a general staff officer of the Division as shown at (C).

b. The non-divisional or corps installation model (B) would apply within TRADOC, DARCOM, and others. In this instance there is no ACS PA.

c. Model (C) reflects a division staff located on a corps installation (82d Abn; 2d Armor; 1st Cav; 9th Inf). This staff would coordinate their activities with and receive support from the corps-installation.


d. Model (D) would apply outside CONUS and reflects that military personnel support may be provided by a regional personnel center or personnel services company. This model also indicates a title of Chief Personnel and Community Activities if there is no Chief of Staff within the organization.

IV. Program Standardization.


1. Tab C is a matrix listing the personnel and community support programs. The columns reflect a subjective judgment about whether the function is standardized throughout the Army, whether standardization is partially completed or hasn't started. Those listed as candidates have been reviewed with the DCSPER HQDA and will be over time, made as uniform and consistent as possible.

2. The Army Staff is reviewing each of the regulations shown to identify changes needed to standardize the programs. Additional guidelines will be published as revised regulations or in program budget guidance documents.


CONCEPT: DEVELOP A STANDARD PERSONNEL SUPPORT STRUCTURE WHICH REFLECTS SIMILAR FUNCTIONS AMONG VARIOUS MTOE AND TDA UNITS.




DIVISION / CORPS INSTALLATION ④




NON DIVISIONAL / CORPS INSTALLATION ⑤



DIVISION AT CORPS INSTALLATION OR IN COMBAT ③



OCONUS CMTY ⑥



SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

FROM: HQ,TRADOC, FOR THE COMMANDER, Signed by Robert H. Forman,
Major General, GS, Chief of Staff

DATE: 12 August 1983

"2. A review has been conducted of the Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept. This command cannot concur in the organizational scheme as presented. The following provides the rationale for nonconcurrence.

. . .

c. The layering of staff positions between the Chaplain, Medical/Dental Surgeons, Provost Marshal, and the Chief of Staff does not improve effectiveness or efficiency. If anything the danger is the opposite may occur. To increase the distance between commander and the technical advisors for his most visible command programs in the name of standardization is a poor management technique."

SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

FROM: HQ,USA DARCOM, FOR THE COMMANDER, Signed by Chief of Staff

DATE: 9 August 1983

2. The model proposes positioning certain staff elements at levels in the hierarchical strata where their effectiveness is significantly diminished. Of special concern are the following:

a. The Chaplain serves as a key advisor to the commander. He is the proponent and coordinator of many programs and activities having a direct relationship to the religious and moral climate of the command. In this capacity, many of his recommendations may be based on privileged communications, an outgrowth of the confidentiality involved in pastoral counseling. Placing him in a subordinate role where he no longer has direct access to the commander thwarts his effectiveness. The Chaplain should continue to be a Special Staff element with the same placement in the staff structure as the staff Judge Advocate and Inspector General.

SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

FROM: HQ, USA Western Command, Signed by Todd P. Graham, BG, Deputy
Commander

DATE: 10 August 1983

1. Nonconcur with the proposed transfer of Chaplain, Provost Marshal, Civilian Personnel, and EEO/EO functions as part of the installation DCSPER organization. This action would create unnecessary layering and increase costs with no apparent gain, other than reducing the number of personnel reporting to the Chief of Staff. . . . No advantages can be seen for removal of the Chaplain from reporting directly to the Command Group. The proposed layering of this activity would be perceived by the churches and the soldier as the Army's downgrading the importance of religion and an attempt to muzzle the Chaplain's attempt to counsel the Commander on ethical issues.

SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

FROM: Headquarters Military District of Washington, FOR THE
COMMANDER, Signed by Chief of Staff

DATE: 10 August 1983

2. Comments pertaining to the application of the proposed concept in general terms throughout the Army are as follows: . . .

b. Placement of the chaplain: This is an old issue that has been studied, discussed, and staffed through the years with the same end result: the chaplain can best fulfill his or her mission as a personal staff officer of the commander. Access to the commander can be guaranteed only by placement of the chaplain directly under the commander. The chaplain, like the inspector general, has access to information about the command that is vital to a commander and should not be filtered by the restructuring of staff relationships. To layer the DCSPER between the chaplain and the commander would assign a function that the DCSPER cannot legitimately nor adequately fulfill.

SUBJECT: Installation and Community DCSPER Organizational Concept

FROM: HQ,USAREUR, Message approved by Chief of Staff

DATE: 12 August 1983

1. We concur in your efforts to improve the quality and availability of programs and services our soldiers expect and deserve. The Army should standardize to the highest degree feasible.

2. The areas with which we nonconcur are listed below.

a. The concept proposed essentially eliminates the special staff. We nonconcur with placement of chaplains, surgeons, the Provost Marshals and Equal Employment Opportunity Officers under the Assistant Chief of Staff Community Activities (ACSCA) or Chief of Personnel and Community Activities (CPCA).

SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

FROM: HQ,USA Health Services Command, Signed by MG Floyd W. Baker,
Commanding

DATE: 9 August 1983

2. Nonconcur with referenced letter pertaining to commanders of medical and dental treatment facilities and to chaplains.

. . .

7. On HSC installations, the implementation of the proposed concept as regards the chaplain would impair that officer's ability to act as a member of the personal staff of the commander. Subordinating the chaplain creates ethical difficulties in the management of privileged communication, which makes the chaplain's role unique in relation to the commander.

APCH

Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

TO DCSPER

FROM Chaplain

DATE 14 Jul 83

Ch Scott/fth/438-1617

1. Reference DF, APPE-PPB-PR, 5 Jul 83, SAB.
2. The WESTCOM Chaplain strongly nonconcurs with the proposed organizational concept as it relates to the Chaplain.
3. Reasons for nonconcurrence:
 - a. The argument regarding standardization and consistency regarding people programs is specious in terms of the Chaplaincy. For 208 years the Army Chaplaincy has been recognized for its soldiers advocacy and quality programs in meeting religious, moral and welfare needs of soldiers. It is highly unlikely that burying the Chaplain under another organizational element will increase his effectiveness.
 - b. The current system which places the Chaplain on the Personal Staff of the Commander has worked well and does not require change. The study offers no evidence to support the recommended change in placement of the Chaplain.
 - c. Section II, paragraph 1, of the proposed concept suggests the Chaplain could be supervised by one officer, but be rated by someone outside the DPCA organization. Such a schizophrenic relationship abets divided loyalties and potential conflict. It also makes it difficult to fix responsibility.
 - d. Paragraph 2, Section II, suggests placing the Chaplain two or three layers below the Commander (under the ACS, P&A). This layering does disservice to the Commander by restricting the free flow of information and filtering data the Commander may require for sound command decisions affecting religion, morals and morale. In sensitive areas critical information should be shared with the Commander only. Subordinating the Chaplain creates ethical and management difficulties in providing information to the Commander and could compromise the privileged communication the Chaplain exercises.
 - e. Although the concept theorizes that the Chaplain could have access to the Commander, from a pragmatic viewpoint he would have to go through three or four staff levels to succeed.
 - f. By regulation the Commander, not the DCSPER/DPCA, is responsible for the religious life and morals in the command. The Chaplain is his executive agent (AR 165-20).
 - g. AR 5-3 encourages placement of the Chaplain in the Personal Staff of the Commander.

APCH

14 Jul 83

SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

h. AR 10-5 places the Chief of Chaplains on the Personal Staff of the Chief of Staff, Army. The proposed concept would place the installation chaplain in a position different than the Chief and could hinder technical communications and management of the Chaplain Branch.

i. If standardization is the desired outcome, the Chief of Chaplains, and this office, supports standardization of Chaplains being on the Personal Staff with direct access to the Commander at all levels.

j. Technical supervision of Chaplains and the religious program could be seriously jeopardized if Chaplains are subordinated under other staff elements.

k. The Chaplain is a unique conduit of information between the Commander and the lowest ranking soldier; he acts as an additional set of eyes and ears for the commands. He is able to assist the soldier to understand decisions which affect the lives of all within the command. Layering and possible filtering of information would seriously affect the credibility of the Chaplain and the trust and confidence soldiers place in him.

l. Placing the Chaplain under DPCA/DCSPER would be perceived by the Churches as the Army's downgrading the importance of religion. It could be perceived as an attempt to muzzle the Chaplain's attempt to counsel the Commander on ethical issues.

4. During the WESTCOM Chaplain's briefing to the new Commander, LTG Lee stated he was opposed to the proposed concept and wants to continue to have the Chaplain on the Commander's Personal Staff (Incl 1).

5. Recommend that WESTCOM strongly nonconcur in the HQDA "Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept."

Incl

JOHN C. SCOTT
Chaplain (COL), USA
Command Chaplain

APCH

11 July 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing to LTG Lee, 8 July 1983

1. General Lee visited the WESTCOM Chaplain Office on 8 July 1983 for a briefing on chaplain functions and activities.

2. Two issues were discussed that General Lee requested special note be made of by his Aide.

a. Chaplain Scott, at the request of the Chief of Chaplains, raised the issue of the DCSPER (HQDA) letter of 10 June 1983, "Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept." Chaplain (MG) Hessian and LTG Lee had discussed this prior to his departure from the Pentagon. General Lee stated he was opposed to the concept and wants to leave the organization as it is with the Chaplain on the Commander's Personal Staff (not under DCSPER). He requested his Aide make a note of this. It is my understanding he would want to see the response before it goes to DA. (I have alerted the WESTCOM DCSPER to this.)

b. The second subject was raised by General Lee himself regarding the Child Care Center at Schofield Barracks. I informed him that the Child Care activities had moved out of the Chapel Center and that it was no longer an issue in this command. He stated, however, to his Aide, that he wanted to look into the Child Care situation here. I believe his concern was primarily with the condition of facilities.

3. General Lee stated he would like to see a variety of religious activities for soldiers and families and that we could count on his support.

JOHN C. SCOTT
Chaplain (COL), USA
Command Chaplain

DACH-PPE

Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

TO DAPE-HRL
ATTN: MAJ Hook
RM 2D742

FROM DACH

DATE 17 Oct 83
Ch (LTC) Kuehne/gb/51409

1. Reference Memorandum, DAPE-HRL, dated 11 October 1983, subject as above.
2. Your draft concept for the standardization of the DCSPER functions at installation level has been reviewed. We nonconcur with your concept for the following reasons.
3. Your draft organizational concept discussion and diagrams fail to note that chaplains at all levels routinely perform some of their duties as personal staff officers and the remainder as special staff officers. This dual placement of chaplains at all levels of the organizational structure supports the coordination and management of religious ministries, the commander's responsibility to insure the free exercise of religion within the command, direct access to the commander on moral, morale, and religious issues, the chaplain's role as confidential advisor to the commander, and avoids ethical difficulties in the management of chaplain's privileged communication. Any restriction of direct access to the commander will be perceived by the civilian churches as a downgrading of religion.
4. Your draft concept (see reference, para II.1.) speaks to staff relationships within the Army TOE structure citing FM 101-5. However, the role of the personal staff officer is omitted in discussion and your TAB D for positions found in organizational diagrams in FM 101-5. We feel this is a serious omission reference the role of the chaplain. We understand that FM 101-5 is at the printers and will state: "The model for all staff structures is the general staff structure shown in figure 2-1" (para 2-3a). Figure 2-1 shows the personal staff group, the coordinating staff group, and the special group. The discussion of "Smaller Unit Staffs" has an organizational diagram which displays this same structure (see para 2-7 and figure 2-6). Omitting these staff structures from your draft concept confuses the role of the special staff sections depicted in your TAB D. Recommend that these paragraphs be considered in your draft concept.
5. According to your draft concept (para II.2.), ODCSPER HQDA is reviewing the cases where direct access to the commander is directed or implied by HQDA guidance with a view to removing this constraint. This office considers that the location of the chaplain on the personal staff in organizational structure is not a constraint and that location must remain explicit to avoid Army-wide inconsistency and to provide for our soldiers a degree of predictability with regard to religious programs and activities (see reference, para I.3.a.).

17 October 1983

SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

6. The organizational diagram (reference, TAB D) places the chaplain under the G1 for primary staff coordination. With the omission of personal staff relationships, the relationships are not clear.

a. The organizational diagrams in FM 101-5 are explicit that the chaplain serves as a personal staff officer and as a special staff officer and should be incorporated in your draft concept. your concept is currently inconsistent with AR 10-5 and FM 101-5.

b. Para III.2.d. of reference then states that special staff officers work for the C/S but coordinate all activities, either TOE or installation through the appropriate G1: "The G1 then has the option of elevating a problem he cannot handle at his level either to the C/S for TOE matters, or to the DIC for TDA or installation matters."

(1) Since the chaplain is not elsewhere shown as a personal staff officer, this wording, together with the diagram at TAB D, creates the erroneous perception that chaplains function only as subordinate staff officers in a structurally undefined position and that the elevation of all chaplain-related issues for coordination and resolution rest on the option of the G1. This assigns a responsibility to the G1 that does not legitimately possess or cannot adequately fulfill, while negating other chaplain functions and duties (see para 3, above). The paragraph implies that all chaplain-related issues must go to the C/S or DIC. This paragraph, focusing only on daily or routine considerations, can be sustained only if it is clearly stated elsewhere that the chaplain also serves as a personal staff officer.

(2) FM 101-5, as described in your draft concept, is a how-to-fight manual. In combat the commander has responsibility for the moral conduct of war. Placing the chaplain on the commander's personal staff results from this responsibility. The draft concept must consider this unique responsibility and similar command and chaplain responsibilities is a revision of para III.2.d. and the diagram at TAB D.

(3) We note also that during combat, the chaplain continually coordinates with the G3 in regard to field services, memorial services, and other ministries. Your draft concept should not restrict chaplain coordination requirements in wartime or peacetime, recognizing that: "Some special staff officers may deal routinely with more than one coordinating staff officer" (para 2-4c(4), FM 101-5).

7. By regulation, the primary function of Army chaplains is to provide spiritual, religious, and moral leadership to the Army community (para 2-42, AR 10-6). Specific functions include advising commanders at all levels concerning the spiritual, religious, and moral needs of their personnel; managing the administrative programs which support chaplain activities at all echelons of command; and formulating plans, policies, and programs concerning chaplain activities at all levels. FM 101-5 recognizes these functions and places chaplains in the organization as personal staff and special staff officers. They should be included in your draft concept.

DACH-PPE

17 October 1983

SUBJECT: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept

8. The personal staff officer and special/separate staff roles have been consistently recognized by commanders as the most effective and efficient methods for organizing to fulfill the dual functions of Army chaplains. The most recent documentation of the importance of these dual roles is found in responses of MACOM commanders to Letter, ODSPER (DAPE-HRL), dated 10 June 1983, subject: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept. Commands were concerned about the placement of the chaplain; recommended that chaplains have the same placement in the staff structure as the staff Judge Advocate and Inspector General; and stated this is an old issue that has been studied, discussed, and staffed through the years with the same end result: the chaplain can best fulfill his or her mission as a personal staff officer of the commander.

9. At Department of the Army level, the Chief of Chaplains is the head of a Special Staff agency and is designated a Personal Staff Officer authorized direct access to the Chief of Staff (para 2-31 and 2-35, AR 10-5). This office strongly recommends that AR 10-5 be considered the Army-wide model for AR 5-3 and FM 101-5. HQDA organizational structure should be mirrored in subordinate levels of command in order to achieve standardization.

10. Installation and community level organizational structures already reflect, in the main, the DA model. Chaplain personal staff officer and special/separate staff positions are well established and understood throughout the Army. Para 4-3, AR 5-3, for example notes that chaplains are typically on the personal staff of the commander. The proposed revision of AR 5-3 staffed 17 December 1981 (BG Hugo, DACS-DMA) placed the chaplain on the personal staff in the organizational diagram at Appendix C for Type A installations.

12. We are concerned at the repeated staffing reference the organizational position of the chaplain. We recently expressed our concern about the staffing of FM 101-5. The version now at the printers was not staffed through us. We were not privy to changes made in the final draft affecting the chaplain. Our requests for reconsideration of certain changes were denied because of printing deadlines.

13. We recommend that the chaplain be clearly recognized as a personal staff officer and special staff officer in all publications for all organizational levels. Experience and professional judgment have consistently and sufficiently affirmed the requirement for both personal staff and unlayered special staff chaplain positions. Your draft concept does not meet this requirement for a revision of AR 5-3 or FM 101-5.

FOR THE CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS:

LEROY T. NESS
Chaplain (Colonel), USA
Director, Plans, Programs
and Policies

INFORMATION PAPER

DACH-ZA
21 October 1983

SUBJECT: The Chaplain as a Personal Staff Officer to the Commander

FACTS:

1. On 10 June 1983 DCSPER floated for concurrence a paper (unstaffed with ARSTAF) to MACOMs, subject: Installation DCSPER Organizational Concept. The avowed purpose of the paper was to standardize staff organizations Army wide.
2. The MACOM response reference the position of the chaplain on the staff universally was:
 - a. That the chaplain does not belong under the DCSPER/DPCA/G1.
 - b. That the chaplain must have direct access to the commander.
3. A new DCSPER initiative on this issue (11 Oct 83) has been floated. It is less radical than the 10 June paper. It contains a wire diagram (which DCSPER will show you in his briefing Monday) and three pages of explanatory verbage. The wire diagram makes it appear that DCSPER has accepted the position of MACOM commanders and the Chief of Chaplains. It shows chaplains responding to the commander directly thru the Chief of Staff.

PROBLEM: The explanatory verbage associated with the diagram is not consistent with the diagram. It subtly still attempts to bury the chaplain under the DCSPER/G1/DPCA.

WHAT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO DO FOR ME:

1. Clearly enunciate your personal position on the issue, which is, as I understand it, that the chaplain is a personal staff officer to the commander.
2. State that you are aware that other commanders expect to relate directly with the chaplain.
3. Publicly ask me if I'm satisfied with the diagram.

(I will state that I know from experience that the best possible position for the chaplain on the staff is as a personal staff officer to the commander. I believe that at every level within the Army the standard should be the

DACH-ZA

21 October 1983

SUBJECT: The Chaplain as a Personal Staff Officer to the Commander

chaplain is a personal staff officer to the commander.
The chaplain will coordinate and cooperate with all staff
agencies concerning issues of mutual interest. It is my
position that chaplains cooperate and coordinate without
being under the control of other staff agencies.)

Chaplain Hessian/51133

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

CSA NOTE:

"DAS, Pls dig into this. I agree with Hessia. that Chaplains must have direct access to commanders. W"

DISCUSSION PAPER

DAPE-HRL
12 December 1983

SUBJECT: The Chaplain as a personal staff officer to the commander

FACTS:

1. In December 1982 Gen Thurman as the DCSPER began an effort to standardize Installation personnel management. This standardization was to address the Personnel Community in the broadest concept.
2. Gen Thurman faced with the responsibility of delivering the human and leadership goals saw the current nonstandard organization of Installation GI/DPCAs as a major road block.
3. In January 1983 a DPCA Doctrine and Proponency workshop was held at SSC. This was made up of MACOM representatives and members of the DCSPER family.
4. After several additional meetings the SSC steering committee briefed a strawman concept to the DCSPER on 1 June 1983. The DCSPER directed the SSC steering committee to staff with the MACOMs. This was accomplished via HRDD on 10 June 1983. Once the MACOM responses were surfaced and addressed, the concept was staffed on the ARSTAF as a proposed policy change prior to briefing the October Commander's Conference.
5. The TRADOC Commander had requested that the DCSPER bring the COA on board and look at standardizing the entire BASOPS. This was accomplished but it was still the DCSPER's desire to lead in the standardization because the need was greatest in the PER community.
6. The strawman concept staffed in June had numerous special staff officers (Chaplain, PMO, Surg., EEO) subordinate to the GI under a DCSPER. The MACOMs and ARSTAF opposed this arrangement. The DCSPER model has been further refined and now has the special staff responsible to the GI as the principal coordinating staff officer for these activities (ENCL 1).

KEY POINTS TO BE STRESSED.

1. There was never any intent to reduce the "direct access" of the chaplain or to lessen the chaplaincies responsibility for religion. The intent was and still is to design a standard structure for the installation that makes the best use of all resources and maximizes economies and efficiencies. The bottom line was to organize for war (FM 101-5) and modify for peace.

DAPE-HRL

12 December 1983

SUBJECT: The Chaplain as a personal staff officer to the commander


2. The PER family has traditionally not functioned successfully in the Programming and Budgeting arena. The strawman concept attempted to centralize the PER family in order to have more clout and a unified programming capability. The modified model at the enclosure will be able to accomplish this unification.

3. An Installation DCSPER Organization Action Planning conference is scheduled for 24-26 Jan 84 to clarify all remaining issues and draft a plan to initiate an Installation DCSPER concept for the 1990s. The CCH office will be a player in this conference. This action has been continuously coordinated with the COA's total BASOPS action and is planned to be briefed to the VCSA o/a 1 Feb 84.


4. The Chief of Chaplains office concurs in the DCSPER model at enclosure.

Maj Hook/76912


INSTALLATION DCSPER ORGANIZATION MODEL



Non Divisional / Corps Installation




Division At Corps Installation or In Combat




① INCLUDES HI-TECH PERSONNEL SYSTEM TO BE INCORPORATED IN ALL DIVISIONAL STRUCTURES.

Division/Corps Installation



① INCLUDES HI-TECH PERSONNEL SYSTEM TO BE INCORPORATED IN ALL DIVISIONAL STRUCTURES.

OCONUS CMTY



13 Dec 83

(U) THE CHAPLAIN AS A PERSONAL STAFF OFFICER TO THE COMMANDER. The issue of direct access for chaplains to the commander raised by the CSA in response to a note from the CCH has been resolved. The Chaplain's concern was over the ongoing DCSPER Installation standardization initiatives. The strawman concept developed by SSC was intended to address the entire Personnel community in the broadest scope. It had several special staff officers subordinate to the G1. The MACOMs and the ARSTAF opposed this arrangement. The DCSPER model has been further refined and the special staff are responsible to the G1 only in his role as the principal coordinating staff officer for personnel family policy and programs. Prepare Memo_____

Maj Hook/DAPE-HRL/76912

Approved by_____

ANNEX IV

ANNEX IV: INTERVIEW SUMMARIES AND RELATED MATERIAL

Annex IV contains:

Biographical Data of Interviewees.....	page 86
Questions used to conduct interviews.....	page 87
Interview Summary, Ch (MG) Gerhardt W. Hyatt, USA (Ret.).....	page 88
Interview Summary, Ch (MG) Orris E. Kelly, USA, (Ret.).....	page 92
Interview Summary, Ch (COL) Albert L. Ledebuhr, USA, (Ret.).....	page 98
Interview Summary, Ch (COL) Charles F. Kriete, USA, (Ret.).....	page 101
Interview Summary, Ch (COL) John C. Scott, USA.....	page 105
Interview Summary, Ch (COL) Harold C. Lamm, USA.....	page 107
Interview Summary, Ch (COL) Richard R. Tupy, Jr., USA.....	page 108

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Hyatt, Gerhardt W., Ch (MG), USA, Retired. Chief of Chaplains, 1 August 1971 to 31 July 1975.

Kelly, Orris E., Ch (MG), USA, Retired. Chief of Chaplains, 1 August 1975 to 30 June 1979.

Kriete, Charles F., Ch (COL), USA, Retired.

- Director of Plans, Programs and Policies, Office Chief of Chaplains (DACH), May 1972 - July 1974.
- Student USAWC, July 1974 - July 1975.
- Staff and Faculty, USAWC, July 1975 - December 1976.
- Commandant, US Army Chaplain Center and School, December 1976 - November 1978.
- Staff and Faculty, USAWC, November 1978 - August 1983 (retired).

Lamm, Harold C., Ch (COL), USA.

- Director of Personnel, DACH, May 1974 - July 1978.
- Executive Officer, DACH, July 1978 - July 1980.
- Executive Director, Armed Forces Chaplains Board, Department of Defense, July 1980 - May 1983.
- First US Army Chaplain, Ft. Meade, MD, May 1983 to present.

Ledebuhr, Albert F., (COL), USA, Retired.

- Post Chaplain, Ft. Benning, GA, July 1970 - June 1972.
- USAREUR Chaplain, June 1972 - June 1975.
- TRADOC Chaplain, July 1975 - July 1979 (retired).

Scott, John C., (COL), USA.

- Action Officer, DACH, Plans, Programs and Policies, July 1977 - July 1980.
- Director of Plans, Programs and Policies, DACH, July 1980 - June 1981.
- Executive Officer, DACH, June 1981 - June 1982.
- USA WESTCOM Chaplain, Ft. Shafter, HI, June 1982 to present.

Tupy, Richard R., Jr., (COL), USA.

- Action Officer, DACH, Career Management Officer, Personnel Ecclesiastical Relations, March 1972 - June 1977.
- V Corps Chaplain, USAREUR, July 1977 - July 1980.
- Commandant, US Army Chaplain Center and School, Ft. Monmouth, NJ, August 1980 to present.

PROPOSED QUESTIONS:

1. What Army programs have you been involved with in the educational and/or human issues areas?
 - a. Army Community Services (ACS)
 - b. Personal Effectiveness Training (P.E.T.)
 - c. Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO)
 - d. Drug and Alcohol Training Centers
 - e. Leadership Training and Ethics
 - f. Child Advocacy Programs
 - g. Family Life Programs
 - h. Race Relations, Equal Opportunity
 - i. Child Care Centers
 - j. Organizational Effectiveness (OE)
 - k. Other
2. Describe your involvement in any of these areas.
3. How have these programs furthered Ministry in the U.S. Army?
4. What are your thoughts on keeping the chaplain on the commander's special and/or personal staff?
5. What are your thoughts about placing the chaplain under the DCSPER/G1 or equivalent?
6. Did Vietnam offer creative or unusual opportunities for ministry? Did the chaplain's ministry change as a result of the Vietnam experience? Were there any initiatives begun in Vietnam that were of particular importance in developing areas of ministry by U.S. Army chaplains?

INTERVIEW WITH CH (MG) GERHARDT W. HYATT, USA, (Ret.), by CH (COL)
HENRY F. ACKERMANN, 17 JANUARY 1984, at ST. LOUIS, MO.

* THE () CONTAINS THE NUMERICAL MEASURING ON THE TAPE RECORDER.

(10) If you want to be useful to the people of the Army you have to have access to the highest level of power and decision making. Essentially, outside of the purely sacramental and liturgical side of your ministry the biggest single position you hold is that of advocate for the soldier and his family. This is, if the Army wants to be selfish about it, the best investment they can make is in good chaplains who will keep the commander fully informed on the troops, where their hurts are, what their aspirations are. It gives the troops an opportunity to ventilate which is highly important just from a psychological standpoint. But ventilate in such a way that if there is a legitimate contribution to be made to the Army in where the hurts are the Army can do something about it. He has to know that those to whom he is speaking have access to someone who can do something about the problem today and not six months down the road. That soldier's hurt is 'today.' The chaplain has to do something about it today but must also impact on the long range policies and programs of the Army in order to insure that the Army becomes a better place to live so that the young person will be attracted to it. And the better place it is to live as a human being, with protected dignity, but a place where you can make a contribution to the Army and to the nation. When you fail to get that direct access to the commander you will get, what Ch Charlie Brown called, 'covering yourself.' Every staff officer will cover himself and insure that the commander gets a clean filtered product. This is exactly the way I put it to the Army leadership when I was Chief of Chaplains. "If you want to know you had better give the chaplain direct access to you, because it is not going to get to you if it is going to get filtered through the staff." This creates risks for commanders, not so much today as it did 20 years ago because the calibre of today's chaplain is so high. But there is still the chaplain who could take advantage of a situation and abuse a position. That is the risk the commander has to take for the overall advantage he will have of having the chaplain have direct access to him.

Before chaplains had direct access to commanders it was difficult to see a smiling, happy soldier; not a good word for the Army. This is not so today. It was a rarity to see the happy soldier.

(74) Humanizing the army. You can't humanize the Army unless you know from the soldiers what is dehumanizing about the Army. If you can't get that from the soldier you can't help the Army. This is not to say we want an easy Army, rather make it a tough, disciplined Army, and to do that is the most humanizing thing you can do. Most commanders today want to humanize the Army in every way that is legitimate. I told General Kerwin many times, and he agreed, that you can have a highly disciplined and well trained Army and still have one that is not dehumanizing. In fact the self discipline that the soldiers are going to develop comes primarily because they love and trust the Army and they believe the Army is doing something to them. Not for them but to them, to make a better person of them.

(110) General Fulton heard my speech at Benning on HSD and the ENLIGHTENED LEADER and tried to get the Association of the US Army to distribute it. That didn't happen.

(120) The whole idea of enlightened leadership came from the chaplaincy. It would never have surfaced through the staff if the chaplains could not have gotten directly to the commander. Ch Al Ledebuhr is an example of this "no staff in the way" idea.

If you want a good corps of chaplains you must, as a leader, demonstrate to them that you can do something to them in their development. We were able to make the chaplains proud of their corps. One of the reasons for the pride was that we could get to our commanders. I could get to the CSA and to the Secretary of the Army and at their own level of assignment so could the MACOM chaplains etc. And the high command of the Army began to visit chaplain conferences and talk the same language. We were able to do something to them and for them through the educational program which we never could have gotten if we couldn't have gotten through to our commanders.

We would never have gotten the Masters program at USACHCS if we had not been able to get through to our commanders. In time we lost it through budget cutback.

(150) To demote chaplains organizationally would be tragic for the Army, not for the chaplains as the chaplains could lean back in their foxholes and have a good time as they would not have that much to do.

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Benning had an NCO housing area that was a total disaster (265). Ch Al Ledebuhr watched that community to see who was the informal leader. It was an E9. Chaplains were never up front as action people on this.

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USAMC (UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE) MILITARY STUDIES
PROGRAM THE CHAPL. (U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS
PA H F ACKERMANN ET AL. 13 APR 84


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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Chaplains were the agents of change from behind the scene. The E9 reported to the chaplain that certain things were needed, who in turn went to the CG and the CG to the first community meeting. First thing the community requested was for a religious service. In short the effectiveness of the group was so dramatic that the chaplain could have written his own ticket with the CG, but did not abuse the success.

(328) How do we translate group effectiveness to personal effectiveness? Again we used the concept of CPE to find our way into the lives of people and then help them to develop themselves as individuals, as soldiers, and for those who wished as Christians; to be effective as a citizen, an individual, and have pride in self and in family. Got further on that at Knox, Ben Price.

(354) NTL was very helpful while all this was being developed. They were almost like another branch of the chaplaincy while this is being developed. Cy Mills was the one on this. [Cy Mills was a civilian consultant and head of NTL].

(410) PET TRAINING. Use of the Taylor Johnson Temperament Analysis tests. The AWOL syndrome test instrument. General Bernie Rogers, as DCSPER or CSA, pushed on this training. Rogers had a commanders' meeting coming up and wanted PET presented to all the commanders. DePuy became a convert to PET at that time. It was too late though for Westmoreland and Palmer who were not convinced that you could no longer have an Army like you had when they were second lieutenants. Palmer may have been but Westy was a little bit above that.

(597) Drug and Alcohol. AWC classmate of mine had the DCSPER slot for schooling spaces. Got spaces at Oklahoma U. for D&A spaces and got 3 spaces for chaplains. I felt we needed 30 or 40 a year but couldn't get them. A year later when I came back from RVN as Deputy Chief of Chaplains I went to him about these spaces and he said he would give as many as needed. Rogers was DA-DCSPER at that time and Rogers came to me and said that DA-DCSPER has to get into the D&A program.

(BEGINNING SIDE TWO OF THE HYATT TAPE)

DRUGS

(10) Drug teams developed and highly trained and sent to RVN, one of the Chaplains on this team was Chaplain Alexander. A medical doctor was put in charge. The first team, the one Alexander was on, got to California to go to RVN and the doctor on the team took sick and as a result Ch Alexander was in charge taking the team over. The second team went thru Madigan Hospital and the doctor who was to go did not go with the team to RVN. The result of these two teams is that once they got to RVN they both had Chaplains in charge, and that was the way it stayed. Ch Alexander became the drug person in RVN and the commanders paid little attention to anyone else. (1-26)

My perception is that the chaplains had hegemony over the entire drug program in RVN (40).

(110) General Fulton heard my speech at Benning on HSD and the ENLIGHTENED LEADER and tried to get the Association of the US Army to distribute it. That didn't happen.

(120) The whole idea of enlightened leadership came from the chaplaincy. It would never have surfaced through the staff if the chaplains could not have gotten directly to the commander. Ch Al Ledebuhr is an example of this "no staff in the way" idea.

If you want a good corps of chaplains you must, as a leader, demonstrate to them that you can do something to them in their development. We were able to make the chaplains proud of their corps. One of the reasons for the pride was that we could get to our commanders. I could get to the CSA and to the Secretary of the Army and at their own level of assignment so could the MACOM chaplains etc. And the high command of the Army began to visit chaplain conferences and talk the same language. We were able to do something to them and for them through the educational program which we never could have gotten if we couldn't have gotten through to our commanders.

We would never have gotten the Masters program at USACHCS if we had not been able to get through to our commanders. In time we lost it through budget cutback.

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The DA-DCSPER added PET training which was a chaplain program.

(130) If commanders don't want to be involved directly with people they should reevaluate their position as commanders of troops and should become staff officers.

(133) If commander has a credible chaplain and doesn't want that chaplain directly responsible to him then that commander should reevaluate his leadership role.

(145) Chaplains have to have confidence in their ministry. Commanders sense the confidence or lack of confidence the chaplain has/not. Here the lazy chaplain is really part of the problem when they don't aspire to a level of involvement with the soldier and the need of the commander.

(190) RVN is where the chaplaincy came of age, as to when I came into the Army; now the chaplaincy is held in awe today by many troops and commanders. My perception is that when I entered the army the chaplain was just so much excess baggage; not so today.

(290) The organizational chart means a lot in the army . . . this sets the climate.

(310) Ch Chuck Kriete is a great proponent of chaplains being agents of change.

INTERVIEW WITH CH (MG) ORRIS E. KELLY, USA, (Ret.), by CH (COL)
DONALD W. SHEA, 16 JANUARY 1984, at BRENTWOOD, TN.

* THE () CONTAINS THE NUMERICAL MEASURING ON THE TAPE RECORDER.

My involvement in a lot of these question areas go back to when I was assigned to DACH in 1970 right out of RVN. Was a LTC, went into PPP in DACH. My initial observation of what was happening at DA level was at that point. Note that I was first in a directorate, then XO and then Chief of Chaplains. There is quite a progression in that. (35)

Second point to make is that when you look at programs like this they often started from individual concerns of individual chaplains. (45) Then were picked up and broadcast throughout the system as viable means of solving some of the army problems. So I would say that any Chief of Chaplains or any individual chaplain who would like to take credit for some of these things doesn't understand how the continuum in the army works. I would like to give more credit to young action officers, or young chaplains or older chaplains who had a vision or a dream and began something. Probably more things grew out of that kind of germinal understanding.

(55) The third thing I'd like to indicate is that there was an atmosphere in the army at that time that allowed new kinds of ministry to be observed. Chaplain Wil Hyatt was Chief of Chaplains at the time when we were talking about the 'new army.' We were looking for programs that would solve some of the human problems. After RVN the army was being scanned by the civilian populace very carefully. The question was what is the army all about, how does it do its business. We had the drug problem along with the alcohol problem which was a very high visible program. The whole army was looking at ways to solve some of the human conditions and was quite concerned about what was happening to the soldier.

(65) The fourth thing that relates to that is, I think, the relationship between the Chief of Chaplains as well as chaplains at every level and the commander. Over the years as I had functioned as a chaplain often the chaplain was under the Director of Personnel and even though he had a direct line to the commander around some issues, too many times that was not a functioning line. This was prior to the 1950s. The chaplain in those years was under the G-1. As I developed in the system I became very aware that that relationship really precluded the kind of church-state understanding that is necessary in this country. So I think you have to look first at the church-state concept if you are going to talk about the conceptional and constitutional base for that growing relationship between the chaplain and that commander.

(84) The rationale for that from my standpoint is that as the commander is responsible for everything that is done or fails to be done, he is not the representative of the faith groups of this country. Only the chaplain is the representative of a faith group. Consequently, just as the commander has to have a special relationship with the JAG because he is not an expert in law or because he has to have a special relationship

with TSURG because he is not a expert in medicine and the commander cannot represent law and medicine . . . only the JAG or TSURG can do that. To me, constitutionally it is the same thing with the chaplain; only the chaplain can represent the faith groups in the context of the military community. Consequently, when the commander is given the responsibility by law for everything that happens in the unit including religion he must be very much aware that he as commander cannot represent religion. He must turn to his chaplain who has to have a direct and close relationship to insure that the faith groups of this country are appropriately represented. And that people who are in the military community are appropriately served. That cannot be done by any other single individual [other than the chaplain]. So to layer an individual like a GI, DPCA or DA-DCSPER between the chaplain and that constitutional relationship with the commander is to misunderstand the base on which this country was founded. So I think you begin constitutionally when you are dealing with the question of the relationship of the chaplain and the commander.

(110) There is another aspect of this thing which happened about that time that was very interesting. My analysis of the chaplains credibility coming out of RVN was that probably more than any other time in our history we [the chaplaincy] came of age. The credibility of chaplains was never higher in my experience and in my understanding of the history of our country. There was an interesting kind of identity where the chaplains role in ministry in RVN came to fruition out of that very difficult conflict.

I'm going to take a chance and quote somebody here, you may want to check it out; MG Bob Solomon, of Jewish background, Bob said, "I came back to Washington after the RVN war and it was interesting to me that the chaplaincy had an entirely different place in the whole system of the army scheme of things. I found the chaplains were alive and alert to issues, were developing programs that had tremendous meaning. It was like a new day for the chaplaincy." (128) Now those are not Bob Solomon's exact words but that is what he was getting across to me, and I respect that because I respect Bob Solomon and he would not say that unless he had seen a new sense. And I think that is true. A new kind of spirit about how chaplains fitted into things. Let me take that a step further. (138) Another aspect of that is leadership. Ch Frank Sampson [former Chief of Chaplains] gave the chaplaincy a new respect and developed an atmosphere of concern for religious faith. I think that was one of Sampson's major contributions. He was followed by Hyatt who had spent half of his 30 years in the Pentagon milieu. What did that do for the chaplaincy? In my opinion it gave us the expertise of an individual who understood the Army system. He understood how personnel fit in, how you programmed, how you got spaces, he understood relationships with commanders, he understood his role. . . . He was one of the two Chiefs who brought the chaplaincy to a maturity that it hadn't possessed. I think it was due to the fact that Hyatt understood the Army, understood the Army system and he knew how to get the chaplaincy involved.

(161) Chaplain Hyatt was there at a very key time when the Army was saying . . . how do we solve all of these human problems. Hyatt, even though he didn't have the idea about the germinal things that needed to be done, established an atmosphere in which he allowed a lot of things to happen, and he was willing to accept mistakes.

(172) Ch Hyatt was a highly respected voice in the Army Staff.

(175) When I arrived on the scene at the Office Chief of Chaplain in the PPP Directorate, I followed on Ch Stan McMasters who has to be credited with some of the germinal ideas for Organizational Development. Stan recognized the need and developed relationships with some of the behavioral science people in looking for some specific ways of providing ministry that tied into some of the human scene. Some of this grew out of the searching going on to look at these human problems.

(189) Army Community Services (ACS) was a later development after many problems had been tried. ACS was the army's typical way, in my opinion, of taking some issues and giving it a focus and scope and leadership and making someone responsible for it.

(196) PET . . . this was not one of the initial things that happened. One of the initial things that drew chaplains into the scene was through the drug and alcohol program. When I became Hyatt's XO the Army had just established under BG Gob Gard the job of focusing for the Army a way to look at the D&A program and go to work on it. Wil Hyatt said to me, "you are going over to work for Bobby Gard for a while, you are going to be on loan; you do the job here [as XO] but you go over and work with Bobby Gard." So Gard and I went over to one of the committees on Capitol Hill and discussed with the staffers what the army was going to do about the D&A program. Then I came back with the mandate of finding some place in the United States a program that could fit the army need to educate around D&A abuse. So I visited several places (they are named on the tape). Out of that whole discussion we made the recommendation that the army use the Yale program. I had to go back and explain this to Congress again because Yale had cut ROTC, and there was a policy that did not allow going in and use a program like the Yale program. Much discussion on this on the Hill, but we sold the program as being the model that was needed in the Army.

(235) D&A. . . . So our involvement at that particular point was around D&A training centers and helping write the educational program for Army at that time.

(238) Along with that, however, was a tremendous concern within the chaplaincy for how we work together. We recognized that unless we as chaplains understood how to function well together, how to team build, how to work with volunteers, how to work with parishes, how to manage programs, that we were never going to be professionals in the eyes of the army. So along with that was the beginning of training a network of chaplains in OD who could go out and help chaplains how to team build. This was part of the growth. The selection of the NTL that came out of National Education Association was fortuitous thing because it was the

most creditable group in the US at that time doing training labs. DACH set up a series of contracts with NTL to train a network of chaplains who in turn would be experts in ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

(263) The spin off of that was that commanders began to see that chaplains had some skill and some strengths that were also useful to them. So it had a broadcast effect. At that time General Bernie Rogers started to see that and he and Ch Hyatt spent a lot of time talking about that program. This was when Rogers was FORSCOM CDR. When Rogers became CSA he determined to set up in the Army what is now called OE training. He wanted to use a different term and get it out of the milieu of the behavioral background and give it an Army cogency. So Rogers set up a school. But this all grew out of this new sense that chaplains were really in the whole business of identifying with Army problems in a different way.

(283) Now what does this say about ministry? This is a problem we run up against all the time; this is not ministry, this is really a kind of play at psychological ploys. And there is some truth to that. There were some chaplains who maybe did lose their pastoral identity and became more amateur psychologists. That is a risk we all took and were ready to take. Also, we established a policy that a chaplain who by faith group background or by personal choice did not want to involve himself in that program did not need to. Only those who personally saw the cogency of the program and could see it as a tool of their ministry were to feel free in joining the program. Therefore each chaplain out of their own faith group had to come to grips with whether or not they saw this as valid ministry.

(314) Out of OE/OD grew programs which were spin-offs like PET, LET, Parish Development (not a direct offshoot), but a time of freeing up chaplains to look at things in a new way.

(330) PET. In my opinion PET was not something that people on high saw as good. It was started by individual chaplains who had received some training in Parent Effectiveness Training and then recognized it would be a great communication tool to help NCOs learn to communicate in a different way with the soldier. This was an attempt to help young NCOs recognize that authority was a much more profound thing than what they wore on their sleeve. That authority grew out of relationship and respect. These were all rooted, in my opinion, for a clergy who understood his pastoral identity in his faith. They would not work without a deep understanding of human dignity and worth which grows out of religious roots.

(353) Another program that developed that grew out of the D&A training centers was from DOD; DOD decided to set up a D&A alcohol training program for their people, and it was related to RACE RELATIONS, down in Florida. That grew out of an understanding that chaplains who had worked in D&A programs and other programs maybe were the ones that ought to be involved with that. The result was that DOD selected a chaplain that they were familiar with and said they wanted that chaplain to be involved in the development of that RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM. That chaplain was one of the key persons in setting up the content of the program.

(381) Found that chaplain spent over 50% of their time in counseling families, and yet most were not trained in family counseling. DACH had been training some chaplains in California in Family Life Programs but had not developed a systems approach to using those skills in a broader base. So we saw the need to set up Family Life Centers or Family Life Programs at posts in which some expertise could be brought together at that center and could be seen as a focal point for families.

(460) VALUES CLARIFICATION. For use in a pluralistic society where at one time we could use the old character guidance lectures, some of the studies show that there was some counter productiveness in the old Character Guidance Programs. We chaplains can take the credit for killing that program because many chaplains did not take it seriously. There is a question over whether you can develop a moral base around even such things as honesty, common sense and all the other titles that were used. Even though they are common in any kind of ethical system, in a pluralistic society how far can you push that and require attendance. I personally think you can. These can be broadly construed as a basic value system of our society. We were looking for some other way since we didn't want to institute it as a total new program, but leave it as an option for commanders. We thought we would do an experiment with VALUES CLARIFICATION. Using some of the New Army money we told USAREUR that DACH would provide the money if they set up a values clarification program. Ch Stan McMaster, the USAREUR Chaplain, set it up and Sydney Simion figured out a survey instrument. Positive responses were received from NCOs. The purpose was to sort out values and NCOs saw that when the troops' values were clarified they became better soldiers. This received a lot of flack from the right wing part of the country.

(548) REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS (RETO). I determined as Chief to look at how we continue the preparation of chaplains for our ministry. Studies indicated we needed to access our ministry periodically. Used the Adelphi method for the input of every chaplain. Purpose was to do an education program that the chaplains could buy in to. Great idea, but not sure if it got off the ground very well.

(755) LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND ETHICS. In order to understand how these things fit together let me try to explain my conceptual base on leadership. In the explanation I would use three interlocking circles for the conceptual base; realizing you cannot develop leadership in any structure unless you have three component parts. The first component part is our own professionalism, in the best sense of professionalism. If I were to talk to chaplains I would want to use the term ministry; our understanding of our own professional integrity as ministers. How seriously we take our ministry and prepare for it. Second part of circle is our whole understanding of the human scene . . . the area of people. Here is where a lot of our school training in the military was sadly deficient. Great on professionalism but often very poor on how we help our young leaders develop their understanding of people and how you work with people. That is why OE to me was so important. Leaders had to, somewhere along the line, confront the fact that they could not be a significant leader unless they took their people seriously. The third part of that is the system sense. Here is where Hyatt trained a lot of us. Those three sum up leadership in any arena.

(903) CHAPLAIN RELATIONSHIP TO COMMAND. So Vital in any of this. When I became CCH and Gen Rogers took over as CSA, we got together and Rogers said for me to set up a meeting every three months, I was to set the dates, to sit down and just talk about the army. Concerns that we both might have. So every three months there was a sort of a free flowing session. If I had been under DA-DCSPER they would have wanted to sit in on it or I would have had to report back. Is that necessary? NO. We are talking about the basic church - state relationship in which the only person that represent the faith group issues and ministry issues for the CSA is the CCH or a chaplain. That has to have that special relationship that varies from CSA to CCH or from chaplain to command . . . whatever. Rogers understood that relationship and respected it and made a point that I was on his personal staff. As a member of that personal staff that gave me a relationship with other members of the staff and an authority and a power that you don't have if you are buried under another staff layer. Advocacy is also a role of the chaplain to his commander and this is not to encroach on the confidentiality of other individuals.

Some are looking for a neat place to put the chaplain in a system so that the system becomes paramount. These are very sharp people who have an Achilles heel when it comes to people.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW CONDUCTED WITH CH (COL) ALBERT L. LEDEBUHR, USA, (RET.), BY CH (COL) HENRY F. ACKERMANN ON 23 JANUARY 1984, at MADISON, WI.

--Primary mission of the chaplaincy is religious ministry. If we restrict ourselves to the chapel programs and religious education programs we are not taking advantage of all the opportunities we have within the military establishment to: 1. Deliver the message; 2. To be God's redeeming people within an institution.

Two significant issues in his time:

1. Education within the educational institutions of the Army. He was assigned as Post chaplain to Ft Benning in 1970 and one of his missions was to establish a chaplain space within the Infantry School. Because of the success of this mission it led to the establishment of chaplain spaces on the faculties of all the service schools. The chaplain would teach and would be the expert in the fields of morals and ethics. He was the one who first taught at Ft. Benning in this program.

These were the days of the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) and the problem was to understand the young soldier better than we had in the past. To do this we established a series of classes of hours of instruction on understanding the young soldier and this became part of a whole Volunteer Army (VOLAR) concept. After teaching that a few times around, General Talbot was so impressed that Chaplain Ledebuhr was asked to give briefings to the Secretary of the Army, CSA and both of their staffs on this series of instructions. While at the AWC Ch Ledebuhr was asked to go to the National War College and give a presentation to the Secretary of the Army and staff. Also went with Bill Steele (later a General) to General Westmoreland's staff meeting where they gave a presentation on understanding young soldiers for Westmoreland and the total Army Staff.

Out of that came a whole development of the use of the chaplain in these educational institutions of the military. It never would have flown if we would have had to go thru DPCA. When I went to Benning I was under the DPCA for first few months and went to Gen Talbot and told him of my mission of getting a chaplain space on the Infantry School Faculty and could not get it done. Result was Gen Talbot took the Chaplain section out from under DPCA and put it under the Chief of Staff. It was that simple.

2. The development of using American Forces Network (AFN) in Europe in providing devotional ministry and taking advantage of interviews of key religious leaders coming to the command that the people did not have the opportunity to hear and AFN wanted to use. This could never have happened while sitting under the DCSPER in Europe. You had to have direct relationship with the top man in the command, the Chief of Staff in the command.

DRUG AND ALCOHOL

Chaplain Herman Keizer . . . was the head of the entire operation and training program in Bremerhaven. This was directly related to the DA-DCSPER because it was the DA-DCSPER's mission and Chaplains coordinated and cooperated with the DA-DCSPER closely and provided manpower. The DA-DCSPER'S job is to deal with people as people. But in other areas like training, like special missions, areas that are not DA-DCSPER or DPCA or G-1 functions, that is a DA-DCSOPS or '3' function and unless we have a direct relationship and can work across lines at that level we are restricted if we get the wrong DPCA or DA-DCSPER, can get nothing done. And the church is bigger than that, it can never allow itself to be hemmed in by bureaucracy . . . it has enough of its own. General Rogers was the DA-DCSPER of the Army at this time and he gave spaces for chaplains to be in this program. This was also a time when General Abrams was CSA and he had also a very close relationship with Chaplain Hyatt (Chief of Chaplains).

It is a demanding thing to be free of DA-DCSPER. It causes the Chaplain to be more innovative and have a bigger concept of ministry than he would have under the DA-DCSPER where he could just have services and counseling and it would be a very simple thing.

Precedent and personal relationships and example are the main arguments for not being under the DPCA. Not sure if anything written. I feel that a case could be made for the relationship of the chaplain to the command and direct access to the commander as a very important part of the endorsing side of the house; churches are not letting clergy into the service to be buried in the bureaucratic system. The rating system is such that if the chaplain were under the DA-DCSPER he would think twice about going over the head of the DCSPER. The military is a system by virtue of which a great majority of the people by being in the system are going to follow the procedures of the system and these are that you will deal thru your chain of command.

Budgeting process goes thru DPCA . . . coordinating function. This is a satisfactory relationship.

HUMAN SELF DEVELOPMENT

Done directly by the chaplaincy.

All of that activity involved the training shop. The DA-DCSOPS or G-3 was the one you dealt with and chaplain has to have a lateral relationship with the '3' shops as they are the ones who say what will be done in training.

Chaplain relationship at TRADOC.

The Myers Briggs Temperament Indicator (MBTI) moved from chaplain family to Ft Jackson and the drill sergeants. Then it became of great interest to the commanders when that went well. I went to Ft Lee and did an MBTI workshop for all the Commanding Generals of TRADOC . . . was not a DA-DCSPER function at all . . . that was related to the Chief of Staff at TRADOC. This may have been able to be done under the DA-DCSPER but not as easily.

WHAT ABOUT FAMILY PROGRAMS

Chaplains were the catalysts to get many of them going and then the Army developed organizational structures. ACS may not have been a chaplain function initially.

If you just want traditional, conventional ministry in the chaplaincy then place them under DA-DCSPER; but if you want to get maximum use and maximum effectiveness from the religious leaders of the military then the chaplain must have direct access to the people who can authorize him to do something other than the normal. If you are under the DA-DCSPER and you ask to do something other than the normal then the DA-DCSPER is going to carry the message to the CS or CG and he will not be able to handle that nearly as effectively as if it were the chaplain who was the salesman for the idea.

Chaplain Hyatt sent a letter to General Talbot (Benning) saying . . . "I am sending you Al Ledebuhr and I am hoping you will use him for more than just conventional chaplain activity. He is equipped and able to handle other things specifically in the area of training." (Copy of letter given to Ledebuhr at his initial interview with CG Talbot and the CG said he concurred with the letter and told him to have at it and keep him (CG) informed.)

INTERVIEW WITH CH (COL) CHARLES F. KRIETE, USA, (Ret.), by CH (COL) HENRY F. ACKERMANN and CH (COL) DONALD W. SHEA, 11 JANUARY 1984, at CARLISLE, PA.

Ch Orris Kelly actually wrote the Army's drug program. That was in 1971 when he was in the PPP Directorate at the Office Chief of Chaplains. Ch Hyatt got 78 plus spaces for chaplains on the drug teams. Gen. Gard was in charge of the drug program within DA-DCSPER. When Ch Kelly went as a student to AWC then I worked with BG Gard. Ch Orris Kelly did the work, Ch Hyatt, as Chief of Chaplains, called the shots.

(35) OPERATION STEADFAST . . . initiated by CSA General Abrams to reduce the DA staff and consolidate Posts and CONUS Armies and streamline the system.

DACH saw that as an opportunity to change the status of the chaplain because we had credibility with the D&A program and some things that were going on in leadership; Ch Hyatt had started some Family Life programs but did not amount to much at that time.

(47) The Army's ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS effort had just begun and we had a program that I started with NTL on training, Orris Kelly had done the leg work, I did the liaison with the Army OE office with COL John Johns. This was a time of turmoil and the MVA was coming in. Taking care of soldiers was Chaplain Hyatt's primary objective.

(65) We thought the time was right to capitalize on what we had done, being involved in all these programs, and put the chaplain on the commanders personal staff. The primary rationale was that it is the commander who cannot afford to have his chaplaincy input filtered by the vested interests of the rest of the staff. The reason it is important not to filter that input is because it is advice that is based on a lot of different privileged communications that cannot be disclosed, but would have to be summarized. You only want one filter on that, the chaplains.

(120) Paper went out to MACOMs recommending that the chaplain be on the personal staff. It drew enough fire that the final position was that it would be optional, personal staff or special staff. Not optional on whether it would be under the DA-DCSPER or not. I think the response was generally about 50% wanted the chaplain on the personal and 50% wanted on the special. You could tell the chaplains at MACOMs who were doing their jobs because they got on the personal staff. Ch Hyatt was disappointed it came out that way, he wanted to make it mandatory. On reflection Ch Hyatt was happy with the answer.

(148) Privileged communication is the most powerful argument. You may have to use that and use all the derivative arguments from it.

(150) We went from there to the PET program and that proved to be interesting. Putting the chaplain on the personal staff created a new relationship with the DA-DCSPER, who happened to be General Bernie Rogers who could handle that. Ch Hyatt made a speech at Benning based on a study done by Scott Cunningham at Harvard on why soldiers join the

Army, he got four standing ovations. General Abrams heard about the speech before Chaplain Hyatt got back to Washington. That was the beginning of the PET PROGRAM.

(175) Anyway, I got with the DA-DCSPER leadership division. I wrote the letter that Rogers signed to authorize chaplains to work on the PET program. Got 4 or 5 chaplains together at Bliss with some CPE and NTL folks and they worked out the PET Program. Which was really designed to train NCOs and junior officers how to deal with troops. How to send "I" messages instead of "you" messages, how to listen, stop swearing.

(190) Organizational Effectiveness (OE) people were threatened by all this. Chaplains were getting things done and OE was trying to get itself established as a corps.

PET program was much more successful in Europe than in CONUS.

(220) LEADERSHIP TRAINING was an outgrowth of the PET program. They began to put PET in the army school system because it was so effective in Europe. Probably decision made to do this at TRADOC.

(263) CHILD ADVOCACY PROGRAM was entirely Ch Hyatt's idea due to communication he got from other chaplains throughout the army.

(275) We [DACH] did start our own OE, I started that in 1972, and used NTL as the trainer and used their people to intervene in our own system. The purpose of it was to make the chaplaincy system work better; the chaplaincy is a decentralized non-system and seemed to be an ideal structure for an intervention vehicle. The purpose of it was to help chaplains minister to (army) social concerns more effectively. Army social concerns are how troops are treated.

(325) RETO. The technique of teaching became as important as the content. Process and content go together . . . this is used at AWC today.

(402) Group process teaching is anti-authoritarian in philosophy; it is based on the idea of participatory management as is the army staff system! The best example of participatory management that I know of is FM 101-5, that little insert that describes Army procedures . . . that is participatory management. There is no better model for participatory management. That is the way we defended it to the critics.

(430) The concept of integrating all training began in the chaplaincy and I'm not sure if it was picked up from Ch Hyatt or if it was just the spirit of the times.

(503) All of this is what made it possible to be on the personal staff to work. If you are on the personal staff you have to make a contribution, you can't be dead weight. You have to make a contribution to the Army as an Army. It is kind of a secular ministry. The rationale for that in Ch Hyatt's mind was that it was ministry.

Ministry has to be proactive.

You can change any organization if the answer to (1) who pays; (2) who gets credit ... is [answer] somebody else.

[Hand written answers by Chaplain Kriete to the questions presented during this interview and listed at the beginning of this annex.]

Question 4: What are your thoughts on keeping the chaplain on the commander's special and/or personal staff?

ANSW: The regulations protecting privileged communication gives the chaplain a unique and special status peculiar to our branch. We must argue that it is not only unique and must be held inviolate, but that it is also the basis of all the other activities chaplains engage in, as it indeed should be, and is not peculiar to any denominations. It is the one common denominator that all chaplains share.

This special status requires that the chaplain be on the personal staff of the commander, not in order to protect the chaplain but in order to protect the commander against compromise of the status. The status creates a relationship between troops, officers and chaplains at all levels that is very valuable to the health of the command by insuring honest communications at at least one level. It would have prevented cover-up of the My Lai massacre [Song My] among other scandals, because the Chief of Staff blocked the Division Chaplain from going back to the CG with his information.

Tech channels also make it advantageous to the Commanders to have the chaplain on his personal staff because he can be more easily kept fully informed--much information flows up and down the tech chain which is unfiltered, or less filtered, than the information through the normal staff channels.

In dealing with "Question 4" this strategy should be to think of the issue from the commander's point of view, not the chaplains, and identify the commander's interests in having the chaplain on the personal staff.

QUESTION 5: What are your thoughts about placing the chaplain under the DA-DCSPER/DPCA/GI or equivalent?

ANSW: The values inherent in the relationships between chaplains and individual members of the Army will remain viable as long as the regulations require privileged communication. However, the organizational effects of those relationships will be different if the chaplain is on the DA-DCSPER/DPCA/GI staff element. The commander alone, not even including the C/S, has no vested interest in any Army unit or organization. Putting the chaplain under Army staff element is a good way to terminate his value to the command and the commander.

QUESTION 6: RVN experience.

ANSW: Yes, it offered many opportunities for creative ministry. No, ministry did not change as a result of Vietnam --- the accusations made about the branch by pacifists and CALCAV were too broad and too general to be credible, and too many chaplains did not fit the CALCAV stereotype for it to stick. I do not know of any Vietnam initiatives that have survived the loss of the war.

INTERVIEW PROVIDED BY CH (COL) JOHN C. SCOTT, COMMAND CHAPLAIN, USA WESTCOM, FT. SHAFTER, HI. 21 JANUARY 1984. CHAPLAIN SCOTT WAS PROVIDED THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND ASKED TO RESPOND. SYNOPSIS OF HIS RESPONSE IS RECORDED HERE.

* THE () CONTAINS THE NUMERICAL MEASURING ON THE TAPE RECORDER.

(33) PET . . . began in 1974-75. I really think the whole PET aspect began with a conversation between Wil Hyatt (CCH) and the DA-DCSPER or CSA at that time. General Rogers was the DCSPER. As a result of that conversation and the identification of some weaknesses within the NCO corps and the need for training in human relations. Chaplain Hyatt appointed a committee of chaplains who worked with this HUMRO (Human Resources Organization) at Ft. Bliss.

(80) Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO). Emphasis on ethics and leadership came out of this study. We now have a chaplain at Ben Harrison (CAC) who works on the development of ethics training for chaplains. Also put a new emphasis on chaplains at services schools that they should be trained in ethics and should teach ethics. The Army has a trained chaplain in ethics at AWC and Leavenworth. Proponency for ethics is at DA-DCSPER.

(130) DRUG & ALCOHOL. Chaplain Hyatt knew that there were skills that chaplains had that could raise our credibility and secure the chaplain positions in the Army. This was an extremely crucial time in the Army. This was before there were any D&A centers. As the centers opened the chaplains began to pull back from the involvement in the D&A programs so that by 1980 there may have been 4 or 5 chaplains involved.

(155) New emphasis of developing D&A centers in hospitals. This began in the early 1980s; first at Beaumont, TX. The chaplain would be a part of that full time team.

(185) TRAINING AND ETHICS . . . began in early 70s under Chaplain Hyatt. I think the first one was at Ft. Knox, Ben Price the post chaplain . . . teaching at the Armor school and the brigade leadership course there. This fanned out to Ft. Benning at the Infantry school and eventually had about 12 or 13 chaplains at various schools. Chaplains had an image at that time to have a great deal to contribute to the development of NCOs and officers. I became the director of leadership and management at the Sergeants Major Academy.

(227) FAMILY LIFE . . . high visibility under Chaplain Orris Kelly. DACH saw family life as a critical issue in the Army and an area in which chaplains needed to be very involved. Later on the DA-DCSPER and the DAAG became more involved in family life issues and there were some turf issues in the late 70s over who ought to have proponency and who ought to be involved in family life issues. DACH position was that DACH didn't want to have the whole family life issue in our lap, that DACH was interested in family life ministry, that the chaplaincy brought a theological and spiritual dimension to this family life need that no one else could meet.

(255) The development and detail on the official policy statement on FAMILY LIFE and CENTERS.

(375) Chaplain on Personal or Special staff of Commander. The chaplain should be on either one of those or both. The reason is not because the chaplain makes such an outstanding contribution to the rest of the staff, not because what he give to the commander is more important than what the rest of the staff has to give to him, but because of the prominent place it puts the chaplain on the staff. If the Chaplain was put under the DA-DCSPER or DPCA or any other element on the staff, the chaplain's ministry and the chapel programs throughout the army would be greatly diminished. We would not get the resources, attention or command influence. We would be left to pick up the bits and pieces and try as best we could to provide some kind of ministry for soldiers in the Army. That would be a mistake; a mistake in terms of the constitutional issue of providing and providing ministry to soldiers in the army and a great disservice to soldiers in the army. The only way a chaplain can be effective across the board is to have the chaplain on the personal staff of the commander so that he is able to compete with all the other staff elements for resources, for commanders attention and for the support he needs in order to provide an adequate ministry for soldiers in the army. Anything less than that would be a disaster. What would happen if that happened is that each chaplain would become an independent operator, each one would do what he wanted to do; because there would be no voice, no head, no chief on the staff to whom they could go or who would provide supervision for the rest of the chaplains within that command and this would be chaos and disaster within the Army.

From the churches point of view (426) this would put down the value the chaplains and the endorsing agencies would perceive this as a diminishing of the chaplains role and that ministry to their constituents would be radically effected.

INTERVIEW WITH CH (COL) HAROLD C. LAMM, FIRST US ARMY CHAPLAIN, by
CH (COL) DONALD W. SHEA, 11 JANUARY 1984 at FT. GEORGE G. MEADE, MD.

(1) DRUG AND ALCOHOL --- Gremmels worked up the justification for spaces on the drug teams.

(412) Many of these broad programs that grew out of this period were based on perceptions of where the Army was and what needed to be done as viewed by the CSA (Abrams) and Chaplain Hyatt's involvement with him [as a member of his personal staff] and where the rest of the Army staff was in dealing with many of these problems.

Chaplain Hyatt was on General Abrams' personal staff. If he would have been just represented in that situation thru the DA-DCSPER without the direct communication and direct involvement, many of these opportunities, I'm convinced, would not have taken place. DA-DCSPER would not have had the insight or sensitivity to see some of these issues really having the religious or spiritual roots that they do have, which the chaplain did by virtue of who he is.

INTERVIEW WITH CH (COL) RICHARD R. TUPY, JR., COMMANDANT OF THE US ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL, by CH (COL) DONALD W. SHEA, 9 JANUARY 1984 at FT. MONMOUTH, NJ.

(12) PET was Chaplain Kriete's project. Ch Hyatt, Chief of Chaplains wanted a program to use with young soldiers and young soldier leadership. This would be a kind of fill in for HSD which was phasing out. This was about 1972.

(166) LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND ETHICS. . . . Combined Armed Center now has the proponency for ethics. This is good because there is now more ownership of ethics by the Army than ever before.

(235) OE . . . here chaplains were among the leadership of the program. Some of our civilian consultants doing briefings for Army Staff. It began with Gen Schumacher at Hood and he went to FORSCOM. Rogers was at FORSCOM. I think that was largely started because Chaplain Hyatt was looking for a way in which he could exert some positive influence on the management style of staff chaplains at installations.

(300) What we have here is a historical religious pattern in which the church identifies the need because it has the freedom of expression and movement and control of resources and moves to meet the need. The community as it sees the need being met and highlighted by the church also moves to meet the need and the church then backs out of that need and uses its resources for something else. Can draw a neat parallel between the church and its hospice, hospital, education and the chaplaincy. The chaplaincy was in food closets, etc. What the chaplaincy is able to do is because it pervades the Army. It is at all levels of the Army on all staffs and it has a certain freedom of action and movement. It is capable of moving into areas in which the Army does not yet recognize the need. The danger is to want to keep the turf. Just make sure that the institutional Army is serious about their intent to maintain the project after the chaplains and it off to them.

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